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‘There can be no keener revelation of a society's soul than the way in which it treats its children.’ 
 
1.1. Background  
 
The above statement by former President Nelson Mandela provides the basis upon which we 
must ensure and protect the rights of the children of South Africa.1 In order to sustain our 
democracy, it is imperative that we prioritise the health and general well-being of our children.2 
To this end, the rights of children must be realized and in particular, the right to refuse medical 
treatment. Since the introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa3 (hereafter 
referred to as ‘the Constitution’) children have been regarded as a ‘vulnerable group’ requiring 
protection4 as they were seen as individuals who were incapable of making decisions 
independently; however, the extent of such protection has been debatable.  
 
Prior to the enactment of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Children’s 
Act’) the right to consent to medical treatment was governed by the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Child Care Act’). According to the Child Care Act, children were 
legally permitted to consent to their own medical treatment once they had attained the age of 14 
years, and no further consent from their parent or guardian was required.5 Doctors were in the 
practice of treating children under the age of 14 years without parental consent as long as they 
proved to be of sufficient maturity to understand the treatment that was being performed on 
                                                          
1
 K Abrahams & T Matthews ‘Child Rights Manual: Handbook for Parliamentarians.’ (2011) Cape Town: Parliament 






 E du Plessis, A Govindjee, G van der Walt, ‘The Constitutional rights of children to bodily integrity and autonomy.’ 
(2014) 35 1. 
5
 Section 39 (4) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
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them.6 Doctors treated children under the age of 14 years as long as they appeared to be 
sufficiently intelligent and ‘grown up’ to agree to and undergo the treatment independently.7 
 
1.2. The right of the child to consent to medical treatment as provided in 
terms of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
 
The Child Care Act was soon replaced by the Children’s Act. This altered the age at which 
children were able to consent to their own medical treatment. Children are currently considered 
to lack the capacity to consent to their own medical treatment if they are below the age of 12 
years, or if they lack maturity and understanding about the required medical treatment.8 It is for 
this reason that children are believed to be in need of protection from making significant 
decisions regarding their health. This need for protection has initiated the enactment of 
legislation such as section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act which clearly imposes the age restriction 
of 12 years on children consenting to their own medical treatment. In addition to this age 
restriction, children must be of sufficient maturity and have the mental capacity to understand the 
benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment.9 Pursuant to this section, the law is 
clear about the child’s right to consent to medical treatment, however, what remains 
undetermined is the child’s right to refuse medical treatment.  
 
1.3. The child’s right to refuse medical treatment 
 
As mentioned above, the law is objectively clear about the right of a child to consent to medical 
treatment. The refusal of medical treatment, however, is not governed by South African 
legislation. The existence of the right of children to refuse medical treatment has been inferred 
by section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act. This section sanctions the right of a child to consent to 
                                                          
6




 Section 129 (2) (a) – (b) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
9
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 supra. 
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medical treatment and considering that refusal is the converse of consent,10 section 129 (2) of the 
Children’s Act must surely sanction the right of a child to refuse medical treatment as well.11 
Therefore, drawing on section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act, children may refuse medical 
treatment provided that they are sufficiently mature and have the mental capacity to understand 
the nature and effect of the refusal.12 In addition, children must be sufficiently mature to 
understand the risks, obligations and other implications of the refusal of medical treatment.13 In 
other words, children must be competent to refuse medical treatment. Although competent 
children have the right to refuse medical treatment, this refusal may be overridden.14  
 
1.4. Competent children should be entitled to the same rights that are 
afforded to adults 
 
Section 7 (1) of the Constitution states: 
‘[The] Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.’ 
A similar provision found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (henceforward referred 
to as the ‘UDHR’) states that, ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’15 
These provisions affirm that children equally possess and are entitled to enjoy the rights that 
adults possess and enjoy.16 The consequence of these provisions is that decisions made by 
children who are competent to make decisions must be afforded the same respect as decisions 
made by competent adults. Adults, provided that they are competent, make decisions without 
                                                          
10
 C Lemmens ‘End-of-life decisions and minors: Do minors have the right to refuse life preserving medical 
treatment? A comparative study’ (2009) Medicine and Law 479. 
11
 D J McQuoid Mason ‘Can children aged 12 years or more refuse lifesaving treatment without consent or 




 D J McQuoid Mason ‘The National Health Act and refusal of consent to health services by children’ (2006) 96 (6) 
SAMJ 531. Although the author refers to section 39 (4) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 in this article, the same can 
be said to apply to the provisions of section 129 (2) the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, GA Resolution 217A (III). 
16
 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5
th
 ed 2005 600. 
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fear of them being overruled. It is only when adults prove to be incompetent that decisions made 
by them are overruled or made by a third party.17  It is submitted that the same rules must apply 
when faced with decisions made by children, in particular, when faced with refusals of medical 
treatment by children. As long as children display competence to refuse medical treatment, such 
refusal must be respected without being overruled. Refusals made by children who display 
insufficient competence, however, may be overruled or consented to by third parties. However, 
considering that the position of the refusal of medical treatment by children has not been set out 
with clarity in South African law, section 39 of the Constitution stipulates that foreign law must 
be considered in order to develop South African law. 
 
1.5. Foreign case law 
 
International human rights conventions have encouraged the drafters of our Constitution by 
providing a powerful source of direction.18 In addition, foreign laws have also paved a steady 
path of inspiration for our Constitution and these provisions reverberate throughout the Bill of 
Rights.19 It is for this reason that our Constitution makes it obligatory for courts and tribunals as 
well as forums to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.20 Furthermore, 
the Constitution provides the option to courts, tribunals and forums to consider foreign law, if the 
situation calls for such consideration, without making it compulsory.21 Due to the lack of South 
African legislation and case law concerning the refusal of medical treatment by children, it is 
submitted that international conventions and foreign cases dealing with this issue must be 
considered in order to develop South African legislation regarding a child’s refusal of medical 
treatment. 
                                                          
17
 Section 7 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
18
 L Oette Criminal Law Reform and Transitional Justice: Human Rights Perspectives for Sudan (2013) 140.  In 
respect of the rights of children, these influential international conventions include the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which were ratified by 
South Africa on June 16
th
, 1995 and January 7
th
, 2000 respectively.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Section 39 (1) (b) of the Constitution. See Oette (note 96 above; 140). 
21
 Section 39 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 
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1.6. Aims and objectives 
 
This dissertation focuses on the competence of children to refuse medical treatment. It is 
submitted that the age of a child should not form part of the test of maturity that is used to 
determine whether or not children are competent to refuse medical treatment. Competence 
should be the only requirement to be satisfied when faced with the question of whether or not to 
override a refusal of medical treatment by a child. It is further submitted in this dissertation that 
refusals of medical treatment by children should be respected and upheld provided that the 
children making such refusals are competent to do so. It is submitted, therefore, that children 
must be afforded rights on an equal level as those of adults. This submission means that, similar 
to that of adults,22 a refusal of medical treatment by a child should only be overridden if the child 
is incompetent to make such refusal.  
 
It will be shown that overruling the refusal of medical treatment by competent children would 
result in the violation of their rights. In this dissertation, each chapter will identify which rights 
of the child are violated, as well as the manner in which these rights are infringed, by disallowing 
a refusal of medical treatment by children. The infringements of these rights serve as reasons 
why decisions to refuse medical treatment by children are worthy of respect and fulfillment.  
 
Although there may be a spectrum of other rights affected by overruling a competent refusal of 
medical treatment by a child, this dissertation will focus on a selected few. The following list 
represents some of the rights of children that are infringed by overruling their right to refuse 
medical treatment and will be discussed by each chapter respectively: 
 
                                                          
22
 S Elliston ‘If You Know What’s Good For You: Refusal of Consent to Medical Treatment by Children’ in S A M 
McLean (ed) Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics (1996) 42. 
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1. The right of children to express their views.  
2. The right to refuse medical treatment based on competence rather than age. 
3. The right to bodily and psychological integrity. 
4. The right of children to be ‘treated’ in accordance with their best interests: What is really 
in the best interests of children? 
5. The right to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds. 
 
The contribution that is hoped to be made by this dissertation is as follows: 
1. Children do have the right to refuse medical treatment; however it is not enough that this 
right be inferred from another right. The right of children to refuse medical treatment 
must be clearly provided for by the Children’s Act. 
2. In clearly making provision for the right to refuse medical treatment in the Children’s 
Act, the age limit of 12 years that must be met in order to exercise the right to consent to 
(and therefore, to refuse) medical treatment must be removed. It is recommended that the 
Children’s Act adopt a ‘maturity based’ approach when determining whether a child has 
the competence to refuse medical treatment. Age should not form part of the test to 
determine whether children are competent to refuse medical treatment. The test should 
only be one of competence, involving an assessment of the maturity of a child to refuse 
treatment. Two principles of assessing maturity will be recommended. 
3. A test to assess the maturity and competence of a child to refuse medical treatment must 
be developed and the correct professional responsible for making this determination must 
be identified. 
4. Once a child has displayed sufficient maturity and competence to refuse medical 
treatment, this refusal of medical treatment must be respected and upheld. This 
submission is based on the practice followed when faced with the competent decisions 
made by adults. Competent children must be afforded the same rights as adults and 
considering that the only instance where adults are prohibited from making decisions by 
themselves is when they are incompetent, the same rule must apply to children. A refusal 
of medical treatment should only be disallowed if such refusal is expressed by an 
incompetent child.  
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5. Overruling a competent refusal of medical treatment by a child would infringe his or her:  
5.1. Right to express his or her views and participate in matters affecting him or her in 
terms of section 10 of the Children’s Act and Article 12 of the CRC; 
5.2. Right to bodily and psychological integrity in terms of section 12 of the Constitution 
and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; 
5.3. Right to be treated in accordance with his or her best interests according to section 28 
(2) and section 9 of the Constitution and the Children’s Act respectively, as well as 
international and regional human rights conventions; 
5.4. Right to dignity as provided for by section 10 of the Constitution; 
5.5. Right to life as prescribed by section 11 of the Constitution; 
5.6. Right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way as stated by 
section 12 (1) (e) of the Constitution; 
5.7. Right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion in terms of section 15 of the 
Constitution. 
1.7. Chapter Outline 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Children’s Act, and numerous 
other influential sources provide children with the opportunity to voice their opinions and 
express their views. Chapter two will examine the right of children to express their views and 
have these views considered. It is submitted that the refusal of medical treatment is a view that 
children have a right to express. It is submitted further that the views of children must be 
respected and upheld, irrespective of whether these views express refusals of medical treatment. 
The views expressed by a child should be considered in accordance with the child’s maturity and 
stage of development.23 Therefore, it is submitted, that refusals of medical treatment expressed 
by competent children must be respected and fulfilled. To disregard these views would infringe 
upon the rights of competent children to express their views and have such views taken seriously. 
A child may consent to his or her own medical treatment if the child is over the age of 12 years, 
of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and 
                                                          
23
 Section 10 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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other implications of the treatment.24 By implication, this means that a child must be over the age 
of 12 years in order to refuse medical treatment. The child must also be sufficiently mature and 
have the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social, and other implications of the 
refusal of medical treatment. The argument submitted is that irrespective of age, children should 
be allowed to consent to and refuse medical treatment as long as they are of sufficient maturity 
and have the necessary mental capacity to fully understand the benefits, risks and effects of such 
medical treatment. This is because it is of little value to proceed on the assumption that the mind 
of a child matures and develops as slowly as the body. Chapter three will show that there is no 
link between competence and age and that competence to refuse medical treatment can only be 
determined by assessing the child’s maturity. Cases and principles from foreign jurisdictions will 
be discussed in order to support this submission. Foreign law concepts including the ‘mature-
minor’ doctrine and ‘Gillick competence’ will be discussed in order to illustrate that once a child 
is sufficiently mature, competence to refuse medical treatment would be proven. Once a 
competent child has refused medical treatment, such refusal should not be overridden and the 
refused medical treatment should not be enforced against the child’s will. To do so would violate 
the right of a competent child to refuse medical treatment. Chapter three will also deal with the 
fact that whilst legislation requires a child to be ‘sufficiently mature,’ it provides no test by 
which to make this determination. The importance of a child's maturity level and comprehension 
of medical treatment have been a recurring issue that has been dealt with by the courts.25 The 
research undertaken emphasizes the importance of the maturity and understanding of the child, 
but fails to prescribe how these characteristics should be evaluated. There is no systematic 
approach, neither is there a specific test or analysis mentioned in any of these sources.26  
Everyone has the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity. This includes the 
right to security in and control over one’s body and the right not to be subjected to medical 
experiments without one’s informed consent.27 This right further encompasses the right to 
autonomy and self-determination. Children are as equal bearers of this right as their adult 
                                                          
24
 Section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
25
 C E Burden-Osmond ‘When Children Refuse Medical Treatment: Role of Governments and Assessments’ (2002) 
69 Def. Counsel J. 211. 
26
 Ibid. 
27 Section 12 (2)(b) and (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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counterparts.28 This right entails making autonomous decisions regarding one’s body and 
provides protection against unauthorized intrusions against one’s person.29 Children are 
presumed to lack autonomy to make decisions regarding a refusal of treatment.30 It is submitted 
that once such presumption has been rebutted, the right of a child to make autonomous refusals 
of medical treatment will be confirmed. This will allow children to exercise their rights to bodily 
and psychological integrity by refusing medical treatment. It is submitted that the effect of 
disallowing refusals of medical treatment by children effectively violate their rights to bodily and 
psychological integrity. Chapter four will involve an analysis of this constitutionally guaranteed 
right as everyone has the right to determine their own fate and to determine what happens to their 
own bodies. It is submitted that the application of this right should not cease at the mere mention 
of a child who wishes to refuse medical treatment. Children should be afforded protection 
against unwanted medical treatment by exercising their rights to bodily and psychological 
integrity.  
The Constitution assures the importance of considering the best interests of children by stating 
that the ‘best interests of the child are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child.’31 The Children’s Act also guarantees that the best interests of the child will be a 
paramount consideration in all matters concerning the care, well-being and protection of the 
child.32 It has been common practice for parents and courts to overrule refusals of medical 
treatment by children if it is considered to be in their best interests to do so.33 Chapter five will 
involve a critical analysis of the ‘best interests of the child standard’ as a particular medical 
intervention, although life-saving, may not always be in the child’s best interests. This will 
depend on the risks, implications and the degree of discomfort and pain that the child has already 
experienced. Certain medical treatment may result in adverse and crippling effects and may 
quicken the chances of fatalities years after the treatment. In other words, these treatments cause 
more harm than good and are not considered as being in the child’s best interests merely because 
                                                          
28
 du Plessis, Govindjee, van der Walt op cit note 4 at 3. 
29
 H Biggs Euthanasia, Death with Dignity and the Law (2001) 95. 
30
 R G Hartman ‘Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physician Perceptions and Practices’ (2001) 
8(1) The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 88. 
31
 Section 28 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
32
 Section 9 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
33
 McQuoid Mason (note 11 above; 467). 
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it provides temporary relief. Often medical interventions compromise one’s dignity and other 
constitutional rights as it may subject a child to extreme dependency during the prime of their 
childhood.34 This would leave unchangeable effects to be endured throughout what has been left 
of their lives, if they have not already succumbed to the harmfulness of their medical treatment. 
It is submitted that compelling a competent child to undergo unwanted medical treatment that 
does not offer much benefit for him or her, is not in the best interests of the child. 
A number of people lead lives that are firmly grounded on their religious beliefs and practices 
and in so doing are merely putting their constitutional right to the freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion to work.35 However, when this right conflicts with the right of a child to consent to and 
refuse medical treatment, the result could be fatal. Religious credence often prevents a child from 
consenting to medical treatment and thus, is coerced into refusing what could sometimes be 
regarded as life-saving medical treatment. In other circumstances, children themselves wish to 
refuse medical treatment prohibited by their religious beliefs. It is submitted that children who 
are competent enough to understand the nature, risks and consequences of their refusal of 
medical treatment should not be prevented from carrying out their wishes and fulfilling their 
religious obligations. This will be the focus of Chapter six. 
The abovementioned chapters will form the basis of the discussion, with Chapter seven 
providing the concluding remarks and recommendations. 
1.8. Conclusion 
 
It should not be automatically assumed that children lack capacity to refuse medical treatment 
based on their age. The capacity to refuse medical treatment depends on one’s maturity and 
competence to understand the nature, risks and consequences of a refusal of medical treatment. 
Hence, refusals of medical treatment by children who are competent to understand the nature and 
consequences of their refusal must be respected. These refusals should not be overruled by 
parents, courts or other third parties. Once competence of children have been proved, there is no 




 Section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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further reason why their decisions, and in particular their right to refuse medical treatment, 
should not be upheld and respected. 
It will be shown, in the following chapters, that overriding competent refusals of medical 
treatment expressed by competent children would infringe their rights. It is recommended that 
children be afforded the same platform as adults provided that they are sufficiently mature and 
are capable of comprehending the seriousness of their situation. This recommendation has been 
made by considering the fact that a decision made by an adult will be respected unless the adult 
is incompetent to make the decision in question. The submission made in this regard is that 
refusals of medical treatment made by children should only be overruled if they are incompetent 
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CHAPTER TWO 




‘Participation’ has been defined as the process of being involved in decision-making that 
concerns oneself as well as the life of the community within which one resides.36 It incorporates 
having a ‘voice’, which entails exercising control over processes, with having a ‘choice’ which 
allows one to control the decision being made.37 Apropos of children’s rights, the right to 
participate embodies the right of children to partake in processes that affect their lives and the 
right to be heard.38 It has been argued that a child’s participation in society begins as soon as the 
child is born into the world by his or her ability to influence the events that unfold in his or her 
life by their cries, actions and movements.39 Although one cannot help acknowledging the 
broadness of this statement, one must consider the truth that it holds. While these are early 
interactions, such interactions are paid heed to; thus, children discover the influence that their 
voices have upon their lives and these interactions are seen as their way of ‘participating.’40 
Participation lies at the very core of a democratic nation and constitutes the means by which a 
democracy is achieved.41 Participation, therefore, is the fundamental right of all human beings.42 
That being said, the UDHR asserts that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights,43 confirming that children must be granted the right to actively participate in decisions 
pertaining to their lives as well as the right to be heard in a manner comparable to that afforded 
                                                          
36
 R Hart ‘Children’s participation: From tokenism to citizenship’ (1992) UNICEF 5. 
37
 A Moyo ‘Child participation under South African law: Beyond the Convention on the Rights of the Child?’ (2015) 








 Ibid at 4-5. 
42
 Ibid at 5. 
43
 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, GA Resolution 217A (III). 
 
13 | P a g e  
 
to adults. Consequently, children should be permitted to indulge in the four levels of 
participation (provided that they are competent to do so) which begins with the right to be 
informed about a decision that is to be made; being engaged with in order to express a view; 
provided with opportunities to influence outcomes; and making decisions independently which 
includes rebuffing a decision made by others.44 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (henceforth referred to as the ‘CRC’) and the Children’s Act have recognised the 
necessity to create universal rights for children, in accordance with the stipulations proclaimed 
by the UDHR, to express their views and have these views considered.45 In light of the provisos 
contained in these documents, it will be submitted that the right of the child to express their 
views and have their views respected must be observed in the context of medical law when 
children refuse medical treatment. Moreover, it will be submitted, that this refusal that children 
have the right to express, must be respected as is a refusal expressed by an adult.  
2.2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
The notion that children are not entitled to the same rights afforded to adults46 as they are mere 
objects of another’s control and in need of protection from undue involvement in the deliberation 
of significant decisions47 has been eradicated by the dawn of the CRC. The objectives of the 
CRC seek to ensure that competent children enjoy their rights at an equal level of fulfillment as 
adults.48 With this in mind, Article 12 of the CRC was drawn, which declared that children who 
are capable of forming their own views, must be assured by State Parties, of their right to express 
their views freely in all matters affecting them, and that due weight must be attached to these 
views in accordance with the child’s age and maturity.49 The absence of a prescribed age limit by 
                                                          
44
 G Lansdown ‘Promoting children’s participation in democratic decision-making (2001) UNICEF 16. 
45




 Hart (note 36 above; 5). 
48
 Stern op cit note 35 at 14, where statistics were taken from UNICEF, a report called ‘The State of the World’s 
Children 2005: Childhood under threat’. 
49
 Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child.  Ratified by South Africa on June 16
th
, 
1995.  The CRC also proceeds to state that a child shall, in particular, be provided the opportunity to be heard in 
any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. Judicial intervention is 
commonly sought when faced with a refusal of medical treatment by a child. The Article makes provision for such 
situation and ensures that a child will not be intimidated by judicial proceedings thereby discouraged from 
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which to attain in order to express views implies that children do not develop capabilities to form 
views once they reach a certain age. Rather, children become capable of forming their own views 
and opinions once they develop sufficient maturity.50 This argument will be dealt with 
extensively in chapter three. The position that children make competent decisions based on 
maturity rather than age is now confirmed by Article 12 of the CRC. Children, once competent 
and capable, are able to form views even if they have attained competence at an early age.51  
The Article demands the recognition of children as autonomous individuals52 and is indicative of 
the fact that there is an obligation to ensure that children are involved in matters affecting them 
where they will receive the opportunity to express their wishes and have these wishes considered 
according to the maturity that they displayed when reaching the decision.53 It is, therefore, 
asserted that competent and capable children who express their views in healthcare,54 even when 
such views take the form of a refusal of medical treatment, such views must be considered and 
fulfilled alike to those expressed by an adult. It is further submitted that children who express 
views of this nature should not be coerced into changing their views in order to succumb to 
medical treatment as the Article protects children from this common situation by stating that 
children have the right to express their views ‘freely.’55 The word ‘freely’ guards against 
coercion or constraint by parents that may prevent expression of the view to refuse medical 
treatment.56 Therefore, parents may not compel children to undergo medical treatment that has 
been expressly denied by a competent child. The dispensation of medical treatment is a matter 
which directly affects the child concerned, about which the child is permitted to express his or 
her views which is worthy of consideration and fulfillment. A competent child cannot be 
envisaged and treated as subjects of higher authority57 in need of extensive protection58 whom 
are required to succumb to the decisions made by others on their behalf. Competent children in 
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compliance with this Article cannot be deprived of this right unless they, in fact, do not satisfy 
the provisions of this Article. In other words, children who lack competence to express their 
views, lack competence to refuse medical treatment and cannot exercise this right.59 A 
deprivation of this right should only be tolerated in this circumstance. 
Considering these provisions, Article 12 of the CRC recognises the individuality of a child, as a 
person in his or her own right, with the ability to exercise control over his or her own life. When 
a child takes this entitled control over his or her life, the decision must be respected, 
notwithstanding the fact that the decision is a refusal of medical treatment. 
2.3. The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
 
The influence that Article 12 of the CRC has had on the authorship of the Children’s Act is 
apparent by section 10 of the Act, which governs child participation in South Africa. By virtue of 
this section, a child, whom is of such an age, maturity or stage of development, so as to enable 
participation in any matter concerning the child in question, has the right to participate in an 
appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration. Child 
participation endorsed by this section is a central theme of the Children’s Act, as provisions of 
the like resonate throughout the Act. A similar provision has been found under section 31 of the 
Children’s Act, which states that a person holding parental responsibilities and rights in respect 
of a child who takes any decision involving the child which is likely to significantly change, or 
have an adverse effect on, the child’s living conditions, health, or well-being, must give due 
consideration to any views or wishes expressed by the child, taking into consideration the child’s 
age, maturity and stage of development. By endorsing child participation, these provisions 
challenge the stereotypical belief that children are ‘mere dependents’ or ‘property’ incapable of 
autonomous choice thus, requiring protection and conversely, elevate children as equal bearers of 
rights to decide their fate.60 The right to child participation identifies that children occupy a 
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separate personhood from their parents and consequently, have a separate ‘voice’ that must be 
heard and considered in all matters affecting them.61 
In medical law, it is submitted, that children must reap the benefit of the rights sanctioned by 
section 10 of the Children’s Act. Once a child has acquired sufficient competence to enable him 
or her to participate in healthcare decisions (decisions which intimately, gravely and possibly 
fatally, concern the child, thus qualifying as a ‘matter concerning the child’ in terms of section 
10) the child has a right to participate and express views that deserve consideration. Whether the 
views express a child’s refusal of medical treatment matters not to the application of this right as 
the view must be given due consideration. It is submitted that being the view of a competent 
child, such a view must be respected and free from fears of being overruled. 
Prior to the inception of the Children’s Act, when section 10 had not yet been in force, courts had 
decided cases based on the starkly similar principles found in Article 12 of the CRC. One such 
case was Lubbe v Du Plessis62 where Van Heerden J, in applying Article 12 of the CRC, held 
that ‘a court should give serious consideration to a child’s expressed preference and not lightly 
give an order which overrides this.’63 By implication, taking into account the similarities 
between the CRC and section 10 of the Children’s Act, this would mean that section 10 would be 
applied in the same way, stressing the need to seriously consider the views expressed by a child 
which cannot be overridden with ease. It is submitted that when applying this principle to 
settings involving a refusal of medical treatment by a child, such refusal must be taken seriously 
and therefore, upheld, as such refusals cannot be easily overruled.  
2.4. Conclusion 
 
The rights of children to express their views are provided in the CRC and the Children’s Act. 
The provisions contained in these documents indicate that the rights of children to express their 
views are central to children’s rights.  
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Article 12 of the CRC declares that State Parties shall assure, a child who is capable of forming 
his or her own views, of his or her right to express those views freely in all matters affecting him 
or her. The convention further states that these views must be given due weight in accordance 
with the age and maturity of the child.64 The Article does not stipulate a certain age that children 
must attain before their views can be considered. According to the Article, once children are 
capable of forming their own views, they have a right to express those views and have those 
views considered to their maturity and age. This implies that the only requirement to satisfy in 
order for children to have their views considered is that children must be competent to express 
their views. It is submitted that in medical law, when competent children express their views of 
refusals of medical treatment, such refusals must be respected and upheld. This must be done as 
long as the child in question displays sufficient maturity and competence to understand the 
nature and the effect of his or her refusal. Competent children who satisfy the requirements of 
Article 12 cannot be deprived of this right, unless they lack competence to express their views. 
Once children lack competence to express their views, they lack competence to refuse medical 
treatment. Competent children, on the other hand, do not lack the competence to express their 
views. Such children must be allowed to express their refusals of medical treatment and have 
these views respected. 
Section 10 of The Children’s Act governs child participation in South Africa. According to this 
section, a child whom is of such an age, maturity or stage of development, so as to enable 
participation in any matter concerning the child in question, has the right to participate in an 
appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration. This section 
confirms that children have the right to express their views provided that they are sufficiently 
mature and competent to do so. Children are recognised as being ‘separate persons’ from their 
parents and thus, have an independent voice that must be heard. It is submitted that these 
principles must be applied in a medical law context when children refuse medical treatment. 
Children who are sufficiently mature and competent to understand the consequences of their 
refusal of medical treatment must be allowed to express these views and have these views 
considered.  
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It is recommended that the terms of the provisions of the CRC and the Children’s Act should be 
applied in the context of medical law when faced with a refusal of medical treatment by a child. 
Should such child satisfy the requirements of the Convention and the Children’s Act, he or she 
must be able to express their refusals of medical treatment and have these views respected and 
upheld. In other words, the refusal of medical treatment is a view that competent children have 






















The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Based on Competence 




The promulgation of the Children’s Act sought to supplement and give effect to the rights that 
children already enjoy in terms of The Bill of Rights.65 The provisions of the Children’s Act aim 
further to provide children with the care, protection and safeguards that will ensure that their 
constitutional rights are being fulfilled, while their overall well-being is being promoted and 
strived for concurrently.66 The Act governs a wide range of interests and rights that children are 
entitled to, including their right to consent to medical treatment.67 
Section 129 (2) of the Act allows a child to consent to their own medical treatment (or to the 
medical treatment of his or her child) if the child is over the age of 12 years and is of sufficient 
maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other 
implications of the treatment. Although it is a controversial issue about which many disagree 
with due to the lack of legislation governing the right of a child to refuse medical treatment, it is 
a shared belief by the majority that children who are competent and mature enough to consent to 
their own medical treatment in terms of section 129 (2) of the Act, are also competent and 
mature enough to refuse the very same medical treatment that they would have been permitted to 
consent to.68 Informed refusal, therefore, is the counter-argument of informed consent. This 
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chapter proceeds on the notion that consent encompasses refusal. Several countries do not draw a 
distinction between the right of a child to consent to or refuse medical treatment and proceed on 
the argument that once a child is deemed sufficiently mature, they should be afforded equal 
rights as those of adults whom are legally permitted to refuse medical treatment.69 This settles 
the skepticism of whether or not children have a right to refuse treatment confirming that they 
indeed do. This chapter involves a discussion about section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act with 
the intention of discovering the bearing that it has on the right of the child to refuse medical 
treatment. It has been established that once an individual is allowed to consent to an act he 
should, in the same instance, be allowed to refuse consent to the same. 
3.2. An analysis of section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
 
Section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act deals directly with the right of a child to consent to medical 
treatment and prescribes an age limit by which to attain in order to consent to medical treatment. 
Section 129 (2) states that: 
‘A child may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to the medical treatment of his or her 
child if –  
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, 
social, and other implications of the treatment.’ 
The use of the word ‘and’ in section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act specifies that there is a 
compulsory requirement for the presence of both stipulated factors in order for a child to consent 
to, or refuse,70 their own medical treatment. This means that a child must firstly, be at least 12 
years of age and above and; secondly, be of sufficient maturity to understand the benefits, risks, 
social and other implications of the treatment. There is no ‘either/or.’ In other words, the Act 
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uses a ‘combined approach’ in order for a child to be eligible to consent to their own medical 
treatment.71 This approach poses a problem.72  
Acknowledging that this approach is an improvement on the age-based approach followed by the 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983,73 the new combined approach creates an unnecessary assumption that 
all children below the age of 12 years automatically lack the capacity to consent to medical 
treatment without considering the tangible possibility that children below the age of 12 may well 
be sufficiently mature to consent to their own medical treatment.74 This assumption of a lack of 
maturity drastically decreases the right of a child to make authoritative decisions regarding their 
health.75 In consequence, holding the view that all children below the age of 12 are not 
sufficiently mature, and then proceeding to enact it in terms of section 129 (2), possibly restricts 
a child’s autonomy.76 It places an underestimation on the ability of a child to participate in major 
health decisions even when they are capable of doing so.77 Age does not determine maturity nor 
does it mechanically confer capacity on a child to consent.78 In simple terms, age does not bring 
maturity. One must be cognisant of the fact that there may be instances in which a child below 
the age of 12 years may be sufficiently mature to consent to his or her own medical treatment, 
whereas a child who finds him or herself within the bounds of the age requirement may not be 
sufficiently mature to provide consent.79 
The ‘combined approach,’ as discussed above, appears to be stringent and overly protective of 
children.80 Although this approach was introduced for understandable reasons, for the protection 
of the child from poorly-made health decisions, it limits respect for the child’s autonomy.81 The 
reason why a poorly-made decision has been made in the first place is due to the lack of maturity 
of the child. The presence of which must be established in the affirmative before the decision can 
                                                          
71




 Ibid. See section 39 (4) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
74
 J Sloth-Nielsen in C J Davel & A Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (2008) Juta 19 (3). 
75
 T Boezaart Child Law in South Africa (2009) 214.  
76
 L Reynolds ‘Consent and competence in paediatrics.’ (2007) IJCR 503. 
77
 Ibid.  
78
 du Plessis, Govindjee, van der Walt op cit note 4 at 22. 
79
 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T) Global Health and Human Rights 
Database 1. 
80
 Boezaart (note 75 above; 214). 
81
 Ibid.  
 
22 | P a g e  
 
be made in order to avoid a disparaging decision. Children do not make unfortunate decisions as 
a result of their age alone. This principle has been encapsulated in the case of Gillick v West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,82 as will be discussed later in this chapter, where 
Lord Scarman had declared that a minor’s capacity to make his or her own decision is dependent 
upon the minor having a sufficient level of understanding and intelligence to make that decision 
for him or herself.83 The court had agreed that a minor’s capacity to make a decision ‘is not to be 
determined by reference to any judicially fixed age limit.’84 
Correspondingly, in the case of Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health,85 the court 
noted that informed consent depended on capacity.86 The court proceeded to comment on the 
notion of a fixed age requirement to satisfy before one is eligible to provide informed consent 
and stated that:  
‘The plaintiff's approach is a rigid approach to maturity which is blind to the fact of life that there 
will be women below an age who are in fact mature, much as there will be those above that age 
(or any fixed age) who are in fact immature. It fails to recognise and accommodate individual 
differences.’87 
The above submission endorses that informed refusals depend on capacity and cannot come into 
existence upon reaching an irrationally prescribed age. Impositions of strict age limits have 
received discouraging remarks, in particular, from the CRC where there is a lack of an age limit 
found in Article 12.88 As discussed in chapter two, this confirms that the Convention provides 
‘no support to those who impose a strict age limit on the right of a child to express his or her 
                                                          
82
 (1986) AC (HL) 112. This case will be discussed in greater detail as the chapter progresses. 
83
 Gillick supra at 188. 
84
 Gillick supra. 
85
 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T). 
86





 Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child states that children who are capable of 
forming their own views, must be assured by State Parties, of their right to express their views freely in all matters 
affecting them, and that due weight must be attached to these views in accordance with the child’s age and 
maturity. 
 
23 | P a g e  
 
views and to have these views considered.’89 This supports the view that a strict age limit cannot 
be imposed on the right of children to consent to and refuse medical treatment. 
There are a number of authors, scholars and academics who are in agreement about the view that 
there should not be a ‘combined approach’. The suggestion put forward is that an approach 
which focuses on maturity rather than age is preferred.90 This is so because the maturity and 
development of children differ greatly from child to child; as inferred, a strict age requirement 
cannot be applied to a problem that requires subjective testing. It is recommended that an 
assessment of competence to refuse medical treatment should be based on the level of maturity 
possessed by the child concerned. It is submitted that age should not form the basis of a test of 
competence.  
3.3. Maturity as the preferred test of competence: Adopting the Mature 
Minor Doctrine  
 
Maturity is the ability to comprehend, understand and assess the implications of a particular 
matter.91 More importantly, maturity is the ability to understand the nature of medical treatment 
and the risks that follow as well as the consequences of refusing it. Once this has been 
established, there is no other reason why a refusal made by a mature minor should not prevail. It 
certainly should not cease to carry forward on the basis of the child’s age.  
The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Choice 
Act’) provides a good indication that age is not a prerequisite for an astute decision to be made, 
by conferring decisional autonomy on a pregnant minor to terminate her pregnancy irrespective 
of her age. The Choice Act directs that a pregnancy may be terminated upon request by a 
woman92 whom is defined by the Act as being ‘any female person of any age.’93 The Choice Act 
makes no mention of any age limit burdened upon any woman who wishes to terminate her 
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pregnancy, confirming that all woman, of all ages, are permitted to terminate their pregnancies if 
they so wish. The only notable circumstances in which a woman would not be able to request 
and consent to a termination of pregnancy, thus requiring the request and consent of the woman’s 
natural guardian, spouse, legal guardian or curator personae,94 is if the woman is found to be in 
one of two situations. The first situation involves the woman being so severely mentally disabled 
to such an extent that she is completely incapable of understanding and appreciating the nature or 
consequences of the termination of her pregnancy.95 The second situation is if the woman is in a 
state of continuous unconsciousness and there is no reasonable prospect that she will regain 
consciousness in time to request and consent to the termination of her pregnancy.96 These two 
situations are the only situations in which a woman will not be able to request and consent to a 
termination of pregnancy. This clearly indicates that age is completely excluded as one of the 
situations in which a woman would not be competent to request or consent to a termination of 
pregnancy. This confirms that requesting and consenting to a termination of pregnancy does not 
depend on age.  
It is evident that the Choice Act does not adopt an age-based approach requiring a woman to be 
of a certain age in order to request and consent to a termination of pregnancy and merely requires 
a female minor to provide her informed consent to the termination of her pregnancy on condition 
that she is capable of doing so.97 Hence, it is submitted that section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act 
should ideally follow suit and allow a child, regardless of age, to consent to and refuse consent to 
medical treatment as long as they are competent and capable of doing so. 
A number of countries allow children of any age to acquire rights of consent to and refusal of 
medical treatment if the child can show ‘sufficient understanding’ of what is being consented to 
or refused.98 One such example is British Columbian Law which has a provision which states 
that a child may consent to his or her own medical treatment on condition that he or she 
understands the nature, consequences and the reasonably foreseeable benefits and risks of the 
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medical treatment.99 Such consent is effective and once acquired, renders it unnecessary to 
obtain consent to the medical treatment from the infant’s parent or guardian.100 The Infants Act 
(RSBC 1996) duly follows a maturity approach and does not stipulate a mandatory age by which 
children may consent to or refuse medical treatment. 
The Canadian Supreme Court was faced with a case which required them to review legislature 
which did not allow a child under the age of 16 to make an authoritative decision concerning 
medical treatment.101 The matter was taken to court by a child of 14 years of age who had 
refused a blood transfusion because it was contrary to her religious beliefs.102 In analyzing the 
maturity of the child, the court concluded that the best approach to the issue was to allow a child 
under the age of 16 to lead evidence of maturity.103 Justice Abella held that by permitting 
children under 16 to lead evidence of sufficient maturity to determine their medical choices, their 
ability to make decisions regarding their medical treatment is ‘ultimately calibrated in 
accordance with maturity, not age;’104 therefore, no disadvantaging prejudice or stereotype based 
on age was employed nor was it needed.105 The court in this case abandoned the idea of an 
assessment of maturity based on the age of the child and focused on the actual maturity of the 
child for a more accurate evaluation.  
A comparable approach had been adopted in the English case of Gillick,106 where the House of 
Lords confirmed that a child who has ‘sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand the 
nature and implication of the proposed treatment,’ is permitted to consent to medical treatment 
independently of their parents, rendering the need for parental consent superfluous.107 This case 
further displayed that the court did not restrict the capacity of a child to an age limit, but rather to 
the child’s maturity. 
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The above-mentioned legislation and case law support the common law doctrine existent in 
many countries that any minor who is mature and is able to sufficiently understand the nature of 
the proposed medical treatment is able to consent to and refuse consent to such treatment, 
without making the attainment of a certain age a necessity.108 This doctrine has been termed the 
‘Mature Minor’ doctrine, which is based on the principle that minors who display a sufficient 
level of maturity ought to have their decisions respected by others, irrespective of their age.109 
Such minors deserve to have their desires and preferences accorded a tremendous amount of 
weight as once they have been declared a ‘Mature Minor,’ they are considered to be a de facto 
adult who should be treated as a legal adult.110 This doctrine is supplemented by studies in child 
development which prove that children have the requisite competence and maturity to make 
informed autonomous choices which should be respected to the same degree as those of 
adults.111 These informed autonomous choices require the presence of three capacities in order to 
make mature and competent decisions: capacities for communication and understanding of 
information; capacities for reasoning and deliberation and; capacities to have and apply a set of 
values.112 These capacities are necessary in order to ensure that choices made by individuals are 
truly competent and mature autonomous choices that correlate with their perception of well-
being.113 While adults are presumed to have this capacity, minors are presumed to lack the 
capacity to rise to the level of maturity required to make a competent autonomous decision.114  
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There is a lack of empirical data in support of this presumption that children have an inability to 
reason, understand and communicate about the burden of medical decisions. The lack of 
evidence, however, should not automatically be assumed to be attributed to the inability of 
children to reason, understand and communicate their decisions about the refusal of medical 
treatment.115 Research proves that many children reach adult levels of competence and maturity 
(making them no less competent to consent to and refuse treatment than adults116) while they are 
still legally considered to be minors.117 Research also suggests that adults do not possess 
understanding and reasoning faculties that are superior to that of children;118 therefore, to assume 
that children lack the capacity to reason, understand and make mature decisions, without 
assessing the actual maturity of the child, is a colossal error. Research also suggests that adults 
do not possess understanding and reasoning skills that are superior to that of children. It is a 
further presumption that children have limited life experience119 which causes them to attach 
inadequate weight to the consequences and effects of their health care decisions and they may 
also fail to consider future changes in their values that may easily be predictable by their 
superiors.120 Minors are alleged to place greater emphasis on the present rather than the future 
consequences of their decisions121 and are believed to engage in perilous risk-taking more often 
than adults.122  
All of these poor assumptions lend themselves to the misconception that all minors need to be 
protected from themselves and their decisions until the conception of well-being that will result 
in competent and mature decisions deserving of respect; in other words, until they reach 
adulthood.123 While all of these presumptions may be true for some children, the same cannot be 
said for all children. One strict assumption cannot be applied as if all children are exactly the 
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same as each other. Maturity is a subjective concept requiring subjective scrutiny124 thereby; the 
only manner by which to determine whether a child is sufficiently mature to make competent 
decisions is to test their individual maturity according to the Mature Minor Doctrine. The 
doctrine simply states that if a child has sufficient competence to maturely make an autonomous 
decision, that decision should be respected without influence or interference by third parties.125 
This doctrine focuses on the fact that certain children are mature enough to comprehend the 
nature and extent of their medical conditions and make competent decisions regarding the 
same.126 These children have the ability to consider the consequences and effects of their 
decisions which would ultimately be in accordance with their conception of well-being, thus 
obviating protection from their parents or healthcare practitioners.127 These minors are 
sufficiently mature to know what is best for them, and should be allowed to carry out their 
decisions without hindrance. 
3.4. Case law involving the Mature Minor Doctrine 
 
The principles of the Mature Minor Doctrine have been invoked in many foreign law cases; 
however, this doctrine has not been applied to South African cases. The Mature Minor Doctrine 
has not been adopted in South Africa. Thus, the following cases reflect the position in other 
jurisdictions. The discussion below supplements the recommendation that the Mature Minor 
Doctrine should be incorporated into South African legislation in order to determine whether 
children are competent to refuse medical treatment.  
Applying the Mature Minor Doctrine, foreign courts have appropriately instituted an 
individualized assessment of the maturity of minors to make decisions.128 One such case which 
highlights this principle is Wisconsin v Yoder,129 which involved conflict among three sets of 
Amish parents and the State of Wisconsin.130 The Amish parents were convicted of violating the 
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State’s compulsory education law which required children to attend public or private school until 
the age of 16. However, the parents had forcibly withdrawn their children from school after they 
had completed the eighth grade due to their religious beliefs.131 Justice Douglas suggested that if 
a child makes a decision and is mature enough to have this decision respected, even though it 
may differ from that of his or her parent, the State may well be able to override the decisions of 
third parties.132  
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Cardwell v Bechtol133 were required to consider whether to 
adopt the Mature Minor Doctrine in respect of a minor whom had consulted with an osteopathic 
physician without her parents’ knowledge.134 The court reasoned that the Mature Minor Doctrine 
is to be applied according to the facts of each case and that whether a minor has the capacity to 
consent to medical treatment or not is dependent upon the child’s degree of maturity, ability, 
experience, training, education, or upon the judgement obtained by the minor.135 It further 
depends on the ‘conduct and demeanor’ of the child at the time of the event in question.136 In its 
summation, the court stated that the totality of the circumstances must be considered, which 
includes the nature of the risks and consequences of the treatment concerned, as well as the 
ability of the child to appreciate those risks and consequences.137 On this principle, the court 
concluded that the patient was a mature minor possessing the ‘ability, maturity, experience, 
education and judgment…to consent knowingly to the medical treatment concerned.’138 
Although this case involved the right of the child to consent to medical treatment, as alluded to, 
the right of the child to consent, includes the right of the child to refuse medical treatment 
signifying that according to the Mature Minor Doctrine, a child who is mature enough to consent 
to treatment is equally mature to refuse treatment. 
                                                          
131
 Yoder supra at 207. 
132
 Yoder supra at 242. 
133
 (1987) 724 S.W.2d Tenn 739. 
134
 Cardwell supra at 741 – 743. During the consultation, the healthcare practitioner had incorrectly excluded a 
herniated disc and ensued treatment through manipulations of the patient’s neck, spine and legs. It later emerged, 
after developing bladder and bowel retention as well as diminished sensation in her legs and buttocks, that the 
patient indeed suffered from a herniated disc. The patient together with her parents charged the physician with 
malpractice for a misdiagnosis, failure to obtain parental consent, negligent failure to obtain consent and the 
failure to obtain informed consent. 
135
 Cardwell supra at 748. 
136
 Cardwell supra. 
137
 Cardwell supra. 
138
 Cardwell supra at 749. 
 
30 | P a g e  
 
The 1992 case of Belcher v Charleston Area Medical Center139 involved a minor suffering from 
muscular dystrophy.140 The issue facing the court was whether or not the minor should have been 
consulted prior to a formalization of a ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ order after the minor’s parents were 
asked to sign a progress note stating that the minor should not be reintubated or resuscitated in 
the event of a respiratory failure. In order to decipher this issue, the court had applied the 
‘Mature Minor’ doctrine.141 The court held that the mature minor rule varies from case to case 
and focuses on the maturity level of the child as well as their capacity to appreciate the nature 
and risks of the medical treatment that is to be consented to or refused, confirming the right of 
the child to refuse treatment.142 The court assessed the minor’s maturity based on this doctrine 
and empowered mature minors who satisfied this doctrine to consent to or refuse medical 
treatment, despite their parents’ refusal.143 
Another case recognizing a minor’s right to refuse medical treatment and in favour of the Mature 
Minor Doctrine was the case of In Re Swan144 where a minor, Chad, was maintained by life-
sustaining treatment in the form of a gastrostomy tube which eventually eroded.145 The 
consensus between the physicians and Chad’s parents were that the tube should not be reinserted. 
Furthermore, Chad’s mother had presented evidence to the court that her son would not have 
consented to the reinsertion either as he had expressed his wishes to ‘go in peace’.146 The court 
rejected arguments by the State that Chad’s right to refuse medical treatment was ‘significantly 
reduced’ as he was under the age of majority at the time of expressing those wishes.147 Instead, 
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the court reduced the significance of Chad’s age to a mere factor to consider when assessing the 
seriousness of his wishes;148 the court, by no means, implied that Chad did not have a right to 
refuse medical treatment due to his age. The court upheld Chad’s right to refuse treatment and 
concluded that his wishes were ‘well-informed desires as to medical treatment’ and should be 
respected.149  
Joshua Walker was a minor who had suffered from cancer and his treatment required blood 
transfusions – treatment that was in direct conflict with his religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s 
Witness.150 The New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Walker v Region 2 Hospital151 decided that 
Joshua was a mature minor who had the ability to understand the consequences of both receiving 
and not receiving medical treatment;152 resultantly, he was able to refuse medical treatment. A 
child who had suffered a similar fate to that of Joshua was found in the case of RE A.Y.,153 
where, after refusing blood transfusions that were contrary to religious beliefs, Justice Wells 
concluded that the child had a maturity level that far exceeded that of a 15 year old thereby 
allowing the child to refuse medical treatment.154 
In 1994, Billy Agrelo had undergone two liver transplants for which he took experimental anti-
rejection drugs to prevent his body from rejecting the organs.155 These drugs caused debilitating 
side effects to the point where Benny had refused to continue with the drugs, contrary to his 
parents and healthcare practitioner’s advice.156 Soon after, Benny’s mother had made a decision 
to support his wishes – a decision which inspired a charge of neglect against her.157 The court 
had held separate meetings with Benny, his doctors and his mother and had decided that Benny 
was sufficiently mature to make decisions for himself and prohibited any further infringements 
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of his wishes.158 Benny passed on shortly after his success at court and became widely renowned 
as the mature minor who had the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment.159 
These cases were judged by the use of the Mature Minor Doctrine which allows mature children 
to make decisions worthy of respect. These cases do not attach importance to the age of children. 
Consequently, the first recommendation made in this chapter that the wording of section 129 (2) 
of the Children’s Act be revisited and altered to eradicate the abovementioned ‘combined 
approach’ to solely require sufficient maturity of the child to understand the risks, social and 
other implications of the treatment in order to consent to or refuse medical treatment. Conceding 
that the drafters of this legislation must have included the age restriction of 12 years (although 
seemingly arbitrarily decided upon160) for the sake of uniformity, the second recommendation 
made in this chapter is to change the wording of section 129 (2) to read, ‘who by age or 
maturity’.161 This recommendation had also been made by the Children Right’s Project and 
Local Government where even sufficiently mature children who have not yet attained the age of 
consent will be able to pursue their decisions.162 The second recommendation has been made if 
the first recommendation cannot be implemented. Adopting the approach of the ‘mature minor’ 
will allow for a more accurate subjective assessment, as these circumstances demand a case-by-
case analysis.163 This is attributed to the fact that research conducted and found by 
developmental psychologists recommend that age restrictions placed on children should 
constantly be reviewed, or preferably removed, as the legal capacity of children is a question of 
maturity and not of age.164 When children are considered as ‘mature’, they evidently possess the 
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cognitive capability to understand, appreciate, reason and articulate their decisions equivalent to 
that of adults.165 Another principle based on this reasoning is the principle of ‘Gillick 
competence’ which also endorses the use of a test of maturity to determine competence as 
opposed to the attainment of a certain age. 
3.5. Maturity as the preferred test of competence: Adopting the principle 
of ‘Gillick competence’ 
 
As referred to above, the lack of legislation governing the right of children to refuse medical 
treatment calls upon the consideration of foreign cases. Of particular import in this ambiguous 
area of law is the case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,166 a case 
that has contributed significant guidelines to legal systems in all jurisdictions of the world. This 
revolutionary case has coined the term ‘Gillick competence’, which is similar to the ‘Mature 
Minor Doctrine’ discussed above. It is submitted that the South African legal system would do 
well to adopt the principles that arise from the Gillick case.   
The Gillick case involved a circular issued by the Department of Health and Social Security, 
during 1974, within which advice had been given to girls under the age of 16. The essence of this 
advice was that the decision to provide contraception to a girl under the age of 16 was one to be 
made by a doctor.167 It provided relief for doctors who were consulted at family planning clinics 
by girls under the age of 16 years.168 It stipulated that they were not acting unlawfully if they 
prescribed contraceptives for such girls provided that in doing so, the doctors had acted in good 
faith to protect such girls against the damaging effects of engaging in sexual intercourse.169 It 
permitted doctors to lawfully treat and prescribe for a girl without contacting her parents, and 
stated that doctors should not contact a girl’s parents at all without her agreement.170  
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The court pointed out that the circular stipulated that doctors could provide contraceptives to 
girls under the age of 16 years in exceptional circumstances, those of which would only be 
unlawful if a physical act had been committed against her without her consent. However, the 
court held that a girl under the age of 16 is capable of consenting to medical treatment, including 
contraceptives, ‘if she is a normally intelligent girl who is reasonably capable of assessing the 
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed treatment and providing effective consent to such 
treatment.’171 The ability to consent will further depend on the child’s maturity and 
understanding.172 This would negate the need for additional inessential parental consent.173 This 
principle is known as ‘Gillick competence.’  
A Gillick competent child possesses sufficient maturity and intelligence to enable him or her to 
fully understand the treatment that has been proposed.174 A child who displays Gillick 
competence is a child who has demonstrated a level of understanding that is sufficient and the 
heightened degree of competence and knowledge that enable him or her to make decisions for 
him or herself.175 Such competence cannot be linked to age, but requires an assessment of the 
child’s development and maturity, and his or her ability to comprehend.176 The Gillick competent 
child must display an understanding and appreciation of all associated short-term and long-term 
risks, as well as the emotional, social and psychological implications that result in 
consequence.177 In order to ascertain this, questions are put to and discussions held with the 
child.178  
Gillick competence does not only encompass the right of a child to consent to treatment. It also 
allows a child to refuse medical treatment once they have satisfied the requirements of and have 
been considered to be ‘Gillick competent’.179 Thus, this legal principle applies regardless of 
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whether children are consenting to or refusing treatment.180 The only question that should be 
crucial to ask is whether or not the child is Gillick competent to make this decision of consent or 
refusal.181 One should not question the ability of a Gillick competent child to refuse medical 
treatment; it is equally testing to determine whether a child has the capacity to consent to 
treatment as it is to determine whether a child has the capacity to refuse the same treatment.182  
For years, the Gillick case meant that children had a right to say ‘no’ to treatment as much as 
they had a right to say ‘yes’.183 The decision made by a Gillick competent child, who has the 
necessary maturity to refuse treatment, deserves respect and consideration,184 which, quite 
obviously, implies that such decision cannot be disrespected by an overruling. The judge in this 
case had expressly stated that once a decision has been made by a Gillick competent child, the 
power of the parent of this child to consent or refuse terminates.185 The parental right to 
determine whether or not the child undergoes medical treatment terminates upon the evidence of 
sufficient understanding and intelligence demonstrated by the child.186 Parental decision-making 
authority ends when the child develops ‘sufficient intellectual and emotional maturity’ to make a 
decision.187 This confirms that once a child has been declared to be sufficiently responsible to 
make an autonomous decision of refusing medical treatment, such decision should not be ‘open 
to veto’ by parents, health care professionals, or any other party.188 This decision is one that 
regards the child’s own body and life and has been decided upon by an individual who is mature 
enough to take this responsibility for him or herself; therefore, this decision is one for him or her 
to make alone.189 Hence, to attempt to constrain a competent person to undergo treatment to which 
they persistently object, or to merely raise an objection to the decision, would surely have 
negative consequences.190 A Gillick competent child has the capacity, understanding and 
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maturity to weigh up the consequences of the decision that they have made.191 To disallow this 
competent decision on the basis of disapproving views from parents, health care professionals or 
other parties, is to violate and undermine the bodily integrity and autonomy of the 'Gillick 
competent' child, as discussed in a preceding chapter192  
It is noteworthy, as previously stated, that this principle offers no room for fixed age limits 
relying solely on the capacity of children to make decisions.193 This correlates perfectly with the 
recommendations of a ‘Mature Minor’ approach being adopted. Therefore, it may be concluded 
that a child has the right to refuse medical treatment provided that they have the sufficient and 
necessary maturity to make this competent decision as well as to understand the nature, 
consequences, and the social, psychological and other implications of the decision. It is 
submitted that the South African legal system ought to consider implementing the principle of 
Gillick competence in addition to the ‘Mature Minor’ doctrine. Together, these two principles 
could form a test to assess the maturity of children to refuse medical treatment based on 
competence, as opposed to age.  
3.6. Shortcomings of maturity as a test for competence and 
recommended methods of assessing maturity 
 
The Mature Minor Doctrine and the principle of ‘Gillick competence’ appear to be rules that 
could easily be adopted by South African Law considering that the only prerequisite for a child 
to consent to or refuse medical treatment is the maturity to understand the nature and 
consequences of his or her medical condition as well as the treatment. The maturity level of a 
child to reach this understanding must be sufficient so as to enable the child to make competent 
decisions regarding whether or not to consent to or refuse medical treatment. However, 
determining the maturity of a child is particularly challenging.194 The cases and legislation 
discussed above emphasize the importance of determining the level of maturity of children to 
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make informed and autonomous decisions, yet do not specify the manner by which, nor the 
professional responsible for making this assessment.195  
3.6.1. Methods for determining maturity  
 
Thus far, South African courts have not developed a systematic test by which to satisfy the 
legislative requirements to correctly assess the maturity and understanding of children.196 There 
are no standards which guide the court in making a maturity assessment.197 Hence, it is submitted 
that courts should clarify the legislative requirements that they enforce by enunciating specific 
guidelines to determine the maturity level of a child.198 A consistent method for evaluating the 
ability of comprehension and the maturity level of a child would provide guidance, information 
and possibly answer all of the bemused questions by parents, healthcare professionals as well as 
the courts in situations where a child refuses medical treatment.199 In similar terms, this would be 
the solution to all problems emanating from a child’s refusal of medical treatment. 
The simplest method of assessment would be a psychological one which would entail discussing 
with the child the nature, extent, risks and obligations of the proposed medical treatment as well 
as the effects and consequences of refusing such treatment.200 It is recommended that this must 
be done in the language preferred by the child considering the diversity of languages in South 
Africa.201 Thereafter, the child may be asked to paraphrase the information that had been 
conveyed to him or her in order to understand, in the child’s terms and in the child’s preferred 
language, whether or not he or she truly understands the nature and consequences of the decision 
that they have reached.202 It is submitted that in addition to this, a list of questions should be put 
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to the child that may be suitable for evaluating a child’s ability to refuse medical treatment.203 
Asking children whether they suffer from any symptoms or discomforts, as well as to describe 
the effects that the illness has had in their lives are questions that focus on their ability to 
understand the nature of their sickness, illness or disease:204 Questions such as, ‘Do you think 
that you need treatment?’ or ‘Tell me the effects that the benefits of treatment will have on your 
life?’ or simply, ‘Why do you want to refuse treatment?’ will assist in analysing the child’s 
ability to understand the nature of the recommended treatment and why it is unwanted.205 
Questions which probe the ability of children to appreciate the consequences of refusing 
treatment would be to ask them why they wish to refuse treatment, whether not receiving the 
treatment would benefit them206 and whether they understand the consequences of not receiving 
treatment. A personal conversation such as this would reveal a deeper understanding of the true 
feelings and capacities of the child to refuse treatment. 
Courts have an obligation to render decisions that are logical, fair, judicious and reasonably 
formed and the dearth of tests to determine a child’s maturity opens the floodgates for unfair 
arbitrary judgements.207 For that reason, a list of factors that would be relevant to the court’s 
determination of maturity must be developed. A step in this direction is the case of In re Moe,208 
where the court considered a list of factors to assist in establishing the maturity level of children. 
The court considered the child’s tone of voice, expressions, and general demeanor; whether the 
child’s responses were well informed and articulate; the degree to which the child evaluated and 
made decisions based on relevant information and the child’s ability to understand the decision 
that they have made.209 Although the court in this case utilized these factors in connection with 
establishing the maturity of minor girls to consent to their own abortions, they are equally 
relevant to the assessment of the maturity of children to refuse medical treatment as they 
ultimately pertain to assessing the maturity of minors. The court in Moe considered pertinent 
factors to confirm a child’s capability to make informed decisions, act independently and 
                                                          
203
 Burden-Osmond (note 25 above; 215). 
204






 Waters (note 196 above; 112-113). 
208
 (1981) 298 12 (Mass. App. Ct.) N.E.2d 1038 423. 
209
 Waters (note 196 above; 111). 
 
39 | P a g e  
 
demonstrate resolve and conviction in relation to their decisions.210 It is recommended that such 
factors be adopted and further developed by the South African judicial system in order to offer 
guidance in the assessment of maturity as well as to perform a detailed analysis of the qualities 
of maturity, thereafter determining whether the child in question is able to display those qualities. 
Such recommendation would result in giving effect to the minor’s right to refuse medical 
treatment.  
3.6.2. The professional responsible for determining maturity  
 
The most suitable professional accountable for determining a child’s maturity and understanding 
remains uncertain. The accuracy of an ascertainment of maturity depends on the professional 
making the assessment; therefore, such professional must be qualified to specifically and 
correctly make maturity findings using distinctive expertise unique to them. Some cases have 
preferred the determinations made by judges, while others prefer that judges and courts merely 
be assisted by the expert opinion of witnesses in the healthcare profession. 
Maturity assessments conducted by judges have been criticised for the formal and intimidating 
nature of judicial proceedings together with judges’ limited, superficial and fleeting personal 
interaction with the child.211 Judges do not have the luxury of time nor is it in their mandate to 
specifically make maturity findings as judges are trained in judicial matters and it is judicial 
matters upon which their expertise lies.212 As learned as a judge may be in judicial matters, 
training in disciplines required for the fair and accurate assessment of a child’s maturity level, 
such as medicine, psychology, interpersonal dynamics and sociology, are simply not possessed 
by judges.213 It is submitted that judges are best assisted by medical professionals in making 
maturity appraisals.  
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The treating medical practitioner is usually the person who performs the assessment.214 One 
would be of the opinion that the medical practitioner who is treating the minor would be the 
professional who has the most knowledge about the minor’s medical condition as well as 
whether they understand the nature of it. The maturity level of the minor would be obvious to the 
treating medical practitioner as he or she is the individual who interacts with the minor mostly. 
This being the case, treating medical professionals do not hold the training or expertise that 
would reasonably prepare them to assess the maturity level of a child, rather, they are better 
equipped for providing a physiological assessment of the child.215 Moreover, medical 
practitioners, like judges, do not have the extensive consultation time that is required to assess a 
child’s competence and maturity.216 
Considering that the treating medical practitioners cannot correctly and precisely assess the 
maturity levels of children, proceeding one step further to a more focused and specialised field, 
the correct professionals whose expertise are required to make these assessments are individuals 
who have been trained in cognition and child development.217 These professionals are able to 
assess a child’s personality, maturity and capacity for understanding.218 Child psychiatrists or 
individuals who specialise in behavioural medicine are specifically educated and skilled to assess 
children, their development and maturity.219 Therefore, it is submitted that these trained 




Section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 allows children to consent to their own medical 
treatment if they are over the age of 12 years and of sufficient maturity and have the mental 
capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment. It has 
                                                          
214
 Burden-Osmond (note 25 above; 214). See Ney v Canada (Attorney General) (1993) 1301 (BC SC) where 
Hubbart, J. stated that it ‘appears’ that a doctor should draw maturity findings. 
215
 Ibid. See also C Himonga & A Cooke ‘A Child's Autonomy with Special Reference to Reproductive Medical 
Decision-making in South African law: Mere Illusion or Real Autonomy?’ (2007) IJCR 354 – 355. 
216








41 | P a g e  
 
been submitted that the right to consent includes the right to refuse medical treatment if the child 
is sufficiently mature to understand the nature, risks and consequences of a refusal of medical 
treatment. A child who displays a sufficient level of maturity ought to have his or her decisions 
respected by others, irrespective of his or her age.220 This principle is known as the ‘Mature 
Minor’ doctrine. A principle that is similar to the ‘Mature Minor’ doctrine is that of ‘Gillick 
competence.’ It is submitted that these two principles as discussed above, should be adopted by 
the South African legal system. This submission is based on the fact that the competence of a 
child to refuse medical treatment is not linked to the age of the child. Whether or not a child is 
competent does not depend on the age of the child; it depends on the level of maturity possessed 
by the child. In light of the above discussion, the first recommendation made in this chapter is 
that Section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act be altered to include only a test of competence, rather 
than a test of age and competence. As mentioned above, in the event that the first 
recommendation cannot be implemented, the second recommendation is to change the wording 
of section 129 (2) to read, ‘who by age or maturity’.221 This approach takes into consideration 
that the maturity levels of children differ. It accepts that children possess different levels of 
maturity at different ages, and that not all children over the age of 12 years are mature and not all 
children below the age of 12 years lack maturity.  
Adopting a test for competence that requires an assessment of maturity may prove to be difficult 
considering that South African legislation requires the presence of ‘sufficient maturity’, but does 
not provide the means by which to determine this. It has been submitted in this chapter that one 
may determine the maturity of children by explaining the implications of a refusal of treatment to 
the child in simple language and in a language that the child is able to understand.222 Thereafter, 
the child should be asked to paraphrase, in their preferred language, what has been explained in 
order to determine whether the child is making an informed refusal.  
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Another method of determining maturity includes compiling a list of factors like those referred in 
the case of In re Moe. The considered the child’s tone of voice, expressions, and general 
demeanor; whether the child’s responses were well informed and articulate; the degree to which 
the child evaluated and made decisions based on relevant information and the child’s ability to 
understand the decision that they have made.223 It is recommended that the Children’s Act be 
revisited in order to compile a list of these factors to determine the maturity level of children. 
In addition to not stipulating a method by which to determine the competence of children, the 
Children’s Act does not identify a professional who should make this determination. It has been 
recommended that child psychiatrists or individuals who specialise in behavioural medicine are 
specifically educated and skilled to assess children, their development and maturity. Individuals 
who are trained in cognition and child development also make accurate determinations of the 
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The Constitutional Right to Bodily and Psychological Integrity  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 is the fruit of a democratically-elected 
body that has drafted and adopted this revered document that has been described as ‘the most 
admirable constitution in the history of the world,’224 by Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein.  
One of the three characteristics225 of our Constitution is that it is supreme, which demands that 
all laws or conduct that are inconsistent with it will be regarded as unconstitutional and invalid, 
as the Constitution is the highest law of South Africa and prevails over all other laws and 
conduct and binds all organs of state to the inclusion of Parliament and the President.226 The 
Constitution is largely recognized as the crowning achievement of the country’s breakthrough in 
the realization of human rights for all people.227 The rights afforded by the Constitution belong to 
all citizens of South Africa, irrespective of an individual’s class, colour, or age.228 This is a good 
indication that the rights provided for by the Constitution apply to all individuals equally and do 
not depend on the age of an individual. Children, as well as adults, possess constitutional rights 
and are protected by the Constitution.229 Accordingly, children are able to enjoy the same 
constitutional rights that adults enjoy. This confirms that constitutional rights do not suddenly 
mature, come into being and are capable of enjoyment only when one attains the age of majority; 
minors as well as adults possess constitutional rights on an equal plane.230 This is evidenced by 
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section 7 (1) of the Constitution which endorses the fact that both adults and children alike are 
bearers of the rights contained in the Constitution.231 Section 7 (1) appears to have drawn 
inspiration from the UDHR which asserts that all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights,232 strongly asserting that children possess and are entitled to exercise the very 
same rights that are afforded to adults. 
The new constitutional dispensation identifies a vulnerable group in society, namely children.233 
Since the labelling of children as a ‘vulnerable group’, section 28 had been included in the 
Constitution to provide them with exclusive protection and exclusive rights in areas where they 
were considered to be particularly vulnerable.234 These areas include, but are not limited to; 
family care, basic health care services, protection from neglect and degradation, and legal 
services.235 It is often an incorrect communal belief that the rights established by section 28 are 
the only rights that are afforded to children in the entire Constitution and that no other rights 
stipulated in the Constitution are for the enjoyment of children.236 While these rights certainly 
apply specifically to children, these are not the only rights that apply to them.237 Children are 
entitled to the application, benefit and protection of the other constitutional rights, similarly to 
adults.238 This is so considering that every child is afforded the same protection in the Bill of 
Rights as their adult counterpart.239 Although many of the rights found in section 28 of the 
Constitution mirror the rights found in other sections of the Bill of Rights, there are many rights 
that are not repeated in section 28; however, they still remain as important for children as the 
rights found in section 28.240 These rights include the rights to equality241, dignity242, bodily and 
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psychological integrity243 and individual autonomy.244 The last two rights form the basis of the 
discussion in this chapter. 
4.2. The constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity and 
autonomy 
 
As children are bearers of all rights afforded by the Constitution, they too are entitled to the right 
to bodily and psychological integrity found under the right to freedom and security of the person 
in terms of section 12 of the Constitution.245 The right to bodily and psychological integrity 
includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction;246 to have security in and control 
over one’s body;247 and the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without 
one’s informed consent.248 The quintessence of this right is the right to self-determination, the 
right to autonomy, and the right to ‘life the live that one has chosen.’249 These fundamental rights 
guarantee the sovereignty of individuals to make personal autonomous and independent choices 
that reflect their true desires.250  
In medical law, these rights protect individuals from being subjected to any form of medical 
treatment that is against their wishes, and from any imposition of treatment that is a product of a 
third party’s perception of being in the best interests of the patient concerned.251 The right to 
bodily and psychological integrity is pivotal to the right to refuse medical treatment, hence, 
pivotal to the right to make end-of-life decisions.252 Patients who wish to refuse medical 
treatment, including treatment that will hasten their death, are free to make this decision. In 
doing so, they are deciding what happens to their own bodies. These patients are merely 
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exercising their right to refuse medical treatment as permitted by the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity.  
The rights to autonomy and self-determination provide that a patient commands and exercises 
the ultimate control over his or her own body and is free to make decisions regarding his or her 
health.253 To respect the requests of such patient is to recognise his or her rights to bodily and 
psychological integrity, dignity, and freedom that are inherent to a human being.254 These rights 
encompass autonomy of thought, will; and action.255 This enables patient’s to engage in thought 
processes and think for themselves, make decisions on their terms and act in accordance with 
those wishes.256 It enables a person to understand the information that they have received, to 
undergo a process of deliberation and thereafter, effectively communicate a decision that is free 
from any external influence.257  
While adults are presumed to be legally autonomous, children are automatically presumed to 
lack autonomous decision-making capabilities by virtue of being legally classified as a ‘child,’ 
that is, under the age of 18 years.258 Children are automatically presumed to hold diminished 
autonomy, requiring a third party to make personal decisions regarding their lives and well-
being.259 However, it is submitted, that this automatic presumption, without an enquiry into the 
level of competence possessed by the child in question, contravenes the child’s right to bodily 
and psychological integrity.260 As indicated above, children are entitled to exercise their rights to 
bodily and psychological integrity which automatically grants them the rights to autonomy and 
self-determination. It is submitted that in terms of these rights, children who are of sufficient 
maturity to make competent decisions as result of understanding information and being cognisant 
of the consequences resulting from their decisions, should be recognised as autonomous 
individuals who are entitled to exercise their rights to self-determination and bodily and 
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psychological integrity. By giving effect to these rights, children are able to make decisions 
regarding their own bodies without parental influence. It is submitted that children should be 
authorized to refuse medical treatment and to enforce this decision in terms of the right to bodily 
and psychological integrity. This submission has been made for two reasons. The first reason is 
that children are equally entitled to the right to bodily and psychological and integrity. It is 
therefore submitted that they may exercise this right to effectively refuse medical treatment if 
they are sufficiently competent to exercise the autonomy that they have been automatically 
afforded by the right to bodily and psychological integrity. The second reason is that in order to 
give effect to the right to bodily and psychological integrity, it is obvious that children must be 
competent to make autonomous decisions and once competence has been confirmed, the 
competent refusal must be respected and enforced, even against parental wishes to the 
contrary.261 It is submitted that the right to bodily and psychological integrity of a child should, 
clearly, depend on his or her capacity to exercise it. Children should not automatically be 
assumed to lack the competence to exercise this constitutional right. This is in line with the fact 
that adults are entitled to exercise their rights provided that they display competence to do so. In 
this way, adults and children would enjoy the right to bodily and psychological integrity to the 
same degree.  
The basis of this submission is found in scientific research which demonstrates that adults do not 
exhibit understanding, reasoning and decision-making skills that are superior to the abilities of 
competent children.262 In actuality, competent children are found to exemplify comprehension, 
reasoning and decisional capacities that are the equivalent of the capacities presented by 
adults.263 Studies illustrate that competent children are able to reach decisions with 
‘intentionality and thoughtfulness’ that are no less than adults.264 It is illogical that children who 
display sufficient competence to refuse medical treatment be treated as passive recipients of 
medical healthcare when their ability to ‘navigate the system independently’265 is palpable and 
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mature. Competent child are able to manage the process of decision-making independently, thus 
reaching competent decisions to refuse medical treatment. 
Once a patient possesses the required level of autonomy, his or her right to bodily and 
psychological integrity is protected; thus, rendering nonconsensual intrusions of his or her body 
as an unlawful violation of his or her right to bodily and psychological integrity.266 These 
intrusions remain unlawful violations of a patient’s right to bodily and psychological integrity 
even though they may constitute life-saving medical treatment.267 To interfere with a patient’s 
body without justification in law or without informed consent, is an unlawful and wrongful 
defilement of his or her bodily and psychological integrity.268 Obtaining informed consent for the 
provision of medical care is essential as it promotes the right to self-determination by allowing 
patients to make rational autonomous decisions about their health and bodies, consequently, 
enhancing the patients’ rights to bodily and psychological integrity.269 Therefore, any 
performance of medical treatment without the patient’s informed consent will amount to a 
violation of their right to bodily and psychological integrity, and, possibly, a criminal charge for 
assault. Assault, in this regard, should not be viewed in a literal sense, but rather in the sense of a 
violation of a patient’s bodily and psychological integrity270 considering that the basis of 
informed consent is the right to autonomy and self-determination.271 It is submitted that the same 
principles must apply when an administration of medical treatment has been ordered against the 
refusal of a child, as his or her right to bodily and psychological integrity protects the child from 
unauthorized physical intrusions such as refused medical treatment. This should be the position 
notwithstanding parental demands.272   
Compelling medical treatment against the wishes of children would violate the bodily and 
psychological rights that children enjoy. This had been addressed in the case of Re L273 where the 
court had ultimately concluded that the minor in question had ‘freedom from unwanted 
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infringements of bodily integrity,’ when her putative father requested a paternity test for which 
the minor would have had to undergo a blood test.274 The court in this case, therefore, had 
confirmed that a minor’s bodily and psychological integrity rights are protected from intrusions 
of unwanted medical treatment. Further, this constitutionally guaranteed right safeguards minors 
against the commission of unsought life-saving medical treatment as illustrated in the case of Re 
E.G.,275 where a minor had refused blood transmissions for leukemia.276 The court upheld the 
child’s refusal to be transfused and alluded that a competent child indeed has the right to refuse 
life-saving medical treatment as any commission of such rejected treatment would amount to a 
violation of the bodily and psychological integrity and privacy rights of the child.277 Therefore, it 
is submitted, as adults are comprehensively protected from any nonconsensual intrusions, in like 
manner, children should be accorded the same protection against coerced medical treatment by 
parents or other third parties. 
The National Health Act278 prescribes the right to refuse medical treatment which extends to 
children inasmuch as it applies to adults.279 In terms of this act, competent children who are of 
sufficient maturity and possess sufficient mental capacity, are entitled to refuse life-saving 
medical treatment, without the consent of or assistance by a parent or any other third party.280 In 
light of this, once a competent child has exercised their right to bodily and psychological 
integrity by refusing life-saving, or other, medical treatment, such refusal must be respected. In 
turn, this would respect the constitutional bodily and psychological integrity rights of the child.  
Complementing this right, are the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
terms of Article 8, which are inclusive of the rights to autonomy and self-determination, 
verifying that everyone has the right to respect for their private lives and that there should be no 
interference of the exercise of this right. The private life that this provision seeks to protect 
encompasses the right to bodily and psychological integrity.281 A person’s body is an intimate 
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and sacred aspect of this private life;282 hence, even trifling infringements on a person’s bodily 
integrity may be actionable as a violation of the constitutional right if this infringement is 
committed against the individual’s will.283 The private life that is protected by this convention 
belongs to children, particularly in circumstances when children refuse medical treatment.284 It is 
submitted that when faced with a refusal of medical treatment, children may not be subjected to 
the treatment that they have refused as this would be done against their will, occasioning a 
violation of their private life and their constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity as 
espoused and protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
4.3. The application of the child’s constitutional right to bodily and 
psychological integrity in terms of the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 and in terms of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
 
The constitutional right to make decisions regarding reproduction reveals that this is one of the 
most crucial aspects of exercising control over one’s body, hence, the advent of The Choice 
Act.285 The Choice Act recognises the right of pregnant minors to determine their own fate as 
well as whether or not to undergo a termination of pregnancy;286 the choice is left wholly in the 
hands of the minor. Thus, in terms of reproductive rights, children have salient and expansive 
bodily and psychological integrity rights; however, outside of this ambit, protection of the child’s 
right to bodily and psychological integrity is insufficiently governed.287 The Choice Act appears 
to fully endow and respect the right to bodily and psychological integrity of children in respect of 
the termination of pregnancy, but limits this constitutional right when a child refuses medical 
treatment.288 Section 129 (2) of the Children’s Act grants consenting power to a child in respect 
of their own medical treatment, or the medical treatment of his or her child, provided that the 
child in question is above the age of 12 years and has the sufficient maturity and the mental 
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capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the proposed medical 
treatment. As previously discussed in the former chapter, the obvious corollary of the right to 
consent to medical treatment is the right to refuse medical treatment.289 In view of this, the right 
of the child to consent to medical treatment in terms of section 129 (2) carries with it the right of 
the child to refuse medical treatment. This confirms that children do have the right to refuse 
medical treatment. However, this right is limited by allowing parents, courts and the Minister to 
overrule a refusal of medical treatment by children,290 whereas, the decision to consent to or 
refuse consent to a termination of pregnancy rests solely with the minor in terms of the Choice 
Act. Section 5 (1) of the Choice Act recognises that the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity is a right that even a minor is extensively entitled to. It is a right that should be 
exercised alone, without interference by third parties, by stating that a termination of pregnancy 
may be performed only with the informed consent of the pregnant woman (which includes a 
minor of any age291). This section is supported by section 5 (2) of the Choice Act which 
expressly does not require consent from third parties by declaring that ‘no consent other than that 
of the pregnant woman shall be required for the termination of pregnancy.’ These sections prove 
that the right to make decisions regarding one’s own body, the right to consent to or refuse 
consent to a termination of pregnancy, is a decision that only a competent minor is capable of 
reaching and parents, courts or the Minister do not possess rights to refute the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity of a minor.  It was stated in the case of Planned Parenthood v 
Danforth,292 that: 
 
‘There is not and should not be any constitutional authority to give a third party, including the 
minor's parent, an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his 
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the 
consent.’293 
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As a consequence, decision-making capabilities belong only to the minor. Substituted consent by 
third parties is only accepted when the minor pregnant girl is incompetent294 and this position is 
agreed with.   
These provisions reveal the vast difference in the respect afforded to the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity of a child in terms of the Choice Act and in terms of the Children’s Act. 
The Choice Act allows children to make autonomous decisions regarding their own bodies, thus 
sanctioning minor girls to consent to or refuse a termination of pregnancy without parental or 
legal intervention.295 The Children’s Act, however, restricts the right of a child to refuse medical 
treatment by subjecting this right to parental or legal approval prior to the fulfillment of the 
child’s wish to refuse treatment. It is submitted that similarly to the Choice Act, any restriction 
placed on the right of a child to refuse medical treatment should be limited to circumstances 
where the child is incompetent and does not present with sufficient maturity to understand the 
benefits, risks, consequences, social and other implications of the refusal. Restrictions should not 
be placed on a competent child who provides an informed refusal. Arguments in favour of the 
placement of this restriction in the Children’s Act and not in the provisions of the Choice Act 
reason that pregnant minors are found to be in a unique position requiring a decision to be made, 
one yielding irreversible long-term consequences.296 Making a decision of this nature cannot be 
halted until the minor attains majority.297 Granted that this may be so, such an argument would 
not holder muster as minors who are facing any type of illness are also placed in the same 
‘unique’ position as that of pregnant minors and thus, cannot be distinguished from them.298 The 
situation that ill minors are in is no different to that of pregnant minors. Ailing minors who 
refuse medical treatment likewise have a weighty decision to make, a decision which too, reflects 
their grave situation, need for immediate attention and engenders immense and irremediable 
consequences.299 Another argument supportive of the restriction in the Children’s Act is that a 
refusal of medical treatment is potentially life-threatening; however, life is also at stake in cases 
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of termination of pregnancy, rendering this argument invalid.300 It is submitted that this 
restriction by the Children’s Act is, therefore, unfounded and unnecessarily infringes the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity of a competent child. 
The Choice Act is a well-developed embodiment of the complete and comprehensive recognition 
and respect purveyed to a minor’s right to bodily and psychological integrity. It is submitted that 
since such extensive acknowledgement of this constitutional right is shown in the context of the 
minor’s right to make reproductive health decisions, the same degree of respect can surely be 
shown in regard to the refusal of medical treatment by children. This submission is made 
considering that when a minor refuses to terminate her pregnancy; she is refusing the medical 
treatment associated with and necessary in the performance of a termination of pregnancy.301 In 
essence, the minor is refusing medical treatment; treatment that she is at liberty to refuse in the 
reproductive health context, but is prohibited from refusing when medical procedures are 
considered. There is no clear rationale for limiting children’s rights to bodily and psychological 
integrity in terms of the refusal of medical treatment, but extending it beyond boarders where 
reproductive health is concerned.302 It is submitted that the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity should be implemented and enjoyed by children in all contexts.303  
4.4. Conclusion 
 
The right to bodily and psychological integrity has been included in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa to be equally exercised by adults and children. The right to bodily and 
psychological integrity encompasses the rights to autonomy and self-determination. This right 
allows children to make decisions regarding their bodies. In this regard, children are entitled to 
refuse medical treatment if they so wish. Further, this right protects children from unwanted 
intrusions. This right protects children from being forced to undergo medical treatment that they 
have refused.  
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It has been submitted that once a child is competent to exercise his or her right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, the child is competent to refuse medical treatment. Such a refusal of 
medical treatment must be respected and upheld. To compel a competent child, who is exercising 
his or her constitutional bodily and psychological integrity rights, to undergo treatment, will 
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South Africa holds the best interests of children in high esteem and the seriousness with which it 
takes such interests are reflected in various provisions.304 The Constitution makes it a vital right 
for children and a responsibility to be fulfilled that ‘a child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child.’305 This provision has influenced the drafters of 
the Children’s Act306 to include the paramountcy of these interests in the Act. Therefore, section 
9 of the Children’s Act was drafted to confirm that the best interests of the child shall be the 
primary consideration in all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or 
authority.307 This section has been supplemented by section 7 of the Children’s Act which lists 
several factors that must be considered by relevance when determining what would be in the best 
interests of children.308 Of particular applicability to medical treatment are the consideration of 
the child’s age, maturity, and stage of development309 and the child’s emotional and physical 
security and his or her emotional, intellectual, cultural and social development, together with any 
disability or chronic illness from which the child may suffer.310 Another factor that is of possible 
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relevance to the consideration of what would be in the best interests of the child with regard to 
medical treatment, is the protection of children from any psychological or physical harm that 
may arise from subjecting the child to degradation or harmful behaviour.311 
International and regional human rights conventions such as the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC) are comprehensive instruments which further confirm the importance of promoting 
the best interests of children. The CRC orders that:  
‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration.’312 
These provisions are reaffirmed by the ACRWC which stipulates that the standard of the best 
interest of the child is of paramount importance must be applied in all actions concerning the 
care, protection and well-being of a child.313 
The combination of these provisions guarantees that the best interests of the child will be given 
due consideration and will be the basis upon which all matters concerning the child will be 
decided. However, what is in the best interests of a child with regard to medical treatment 
remains unclear. Parents believe that it is in the best interests of their children to receive medical 
treatment;314 while children who refuse medical treatment clearly hold the view that it is in their 
best interests not to undergo the medical treatment. It will be shown in this chapter that it is not 
always in the best interests of children to compel them to undergo medical treatment against their 
wishes. This is especially so when treatment is futile, offering little benefit to the child. It will be 
shown that compelling treatment to unwilling competent children infringes their constitutional 
rights to dignity and life.  The right to dignity means that ‘patients have the right to have their 
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dignity respected and protected’ if the medical treatment will violate their dignity.315 This may 
occur when invasive and futile medical treatment subjects the patient to indignity, especially in 
situations where the prognosis is hopeless and treatment continues against the patient’s 
wishes.316 The right to life, in a medical law context, suggests that a patient may end his or her 
life should he or she wish to do so.317 It is submitted that competent children should be entitled to 
these rights. Children who are competent to refuse futile medical treatment should not be 
compelled to undergo treatment against their wishes. To do so, would violate their constitutional 
rights and cannot be said to be in their best interests. 
5.2. Is it in the best interests of competent children to override their 
competent refusals of medical treatment? 
 
Decisions which claim to be made in the best interests of children, such as overriding competent 
refusals of medical treatment by children, do not always reflect the wishes of competent children 
and usually reflect what parents want for their children and what they may deem best.318 Parents 
have a genuine interest in preserving the life of their child to avoid the anguish of losing a child, 
or possibly, to abuse their authority.319 For this reason, parents and courts will simply do the 
needful to ‘keep the child alive’ – at all costs, even if imposing unwanted medical treatment 
provides little benefit - as they believe that this would be in the best interests of the child when it 
would produce the opposite effect. Parents do not always act in the best interests of their child.320 
In existence are powerful indications and incidents that attest to the fact that the failure of parents 
to consult their children in decision-making as well as to fulfill their wishes has proven harmful 
to well-being of their children.321 The best interests of the child are best served by allowing the 
child to exercise his or her autonomy by making informed decisions,322 even if these decisions 
include informed refusals of life-saving medical treatment. It is recommended that the competent 
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refusals of treatment, including life-saving treatment, made by competent children who possess 
sufficient maturity to make such decisions should be respected. Decisions made by minors who 
know what is best for them must be respected.323 Neither parents nor courts should prompt 
submission to medical treatment to which a competent child objects.324 It would be seen, 
however, that this practice has seldom been observed. 
In a number of decided cases judges have illustrated their reluctance to regard the wishes of 
refusals of medical treatment by competent children as determinative. Satisfying the principles of 
Gillick competence or the Mature Minor Doctrine appear not to suffice, although a legal 
requirement,325 as a decision made by a child who does satisfy these principles may be overruled 
by the court or the child’s parents.326 Courts or parents overrule competent refusals of medical 
treatment by children if they are of the opinion that the proposed medical treatment is in the best 
interests of the child.327 This being so, the lengthy assessment of competence becomes a 
meaningless exercise to the point where competence merely becomes one among many factors 
that the court considers when determining what would be in the best interests of the child.328 This 
is an incorrect application of the law as competence is the ground upon which children are 
judged in order to determine whether they are capable of making autonomous decisions 
concerning their health. Once competence has been established it should not be marginalized as 
if it holds no value for the sake of an objective notion held by parents and courts of what is in the 
best interests of the child. This has, unfortunately, been the common occurrence in several cases. 
One such case was that of Re W (A Minor)329 where the Court of Appeal had overridden child’s 
decision to refuse medical treatment as the decision would result in the child’s death.330 The 
court had correctly conceded that it cannot lightly and easily override the decisions made by a 
competent child; however, the court had followed this statement by incorrectly adding that it 
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could do so if it were in the best interests of the child.331 An incorrect statement indeed as the 
court had further conceded that it is in the best interests of the child to fulfill his/her wishes and 
carry out his/her decisions.332 It is submitted that a competent child knows what is in his or her 
best interests and if a refusal of medical treatment would be in those best interests then such 
refusal must be respected. The court in this case was well aware that the best interests of the 
child lie with respecting the decisions of the child.  
The case of Re M (Child: Refusal of Medical Treatment)333 differs from the case of Re W  in that 
the child concerned was found not to be competent;334 however, the court stated that outcome of 
the case would have been the same had the child been found to be competent as the court had 
expressed its power to overrule any decision made by a child heedless of whether the child was 
found to be competent or not.335 The court reasoned that the welfare of the child was the 
paramount consideration and if the decision made by the child negatively impacted this welfare, 
the court was obliged to intervene. The court placed emphasis on decisions which result in the 
death of the child and stated that ‘whatever the risk may be in overriding the child’s decision, it 
must be matched against the certainty of death.’336 
In the case of Re W, the court made a finding of competence and nonetheless, had overruled the 
decision made by a competent child. In the case of Re M,337 the court had found that the child 
was not competent and accordingly, overruled the decision. It is submitted that the court in the 
case of Re W was wrong to overrule the decision of a competent child. Moreover, it is submitted, 
that the courts in both the cases of Re M and Re W were wrong to state that whether or not a child 
presents with competence would not affect the outcome of the case as the court will overrule any 
decision that it believes to be in the best interests of the child.338  In these cases the courts 
overturned the decisions for the same reason - the decisions made by the children to refuse 
medical treatment would ultimately result in the death of the children. This indicates that the 
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court will overrule any decision which would increase a child’s chances of dying, whether they 
are competent or not, as courts believe that any decision which hastens death cannot be said to be 
in the best interests of the child.339  
The court in Re W had conceded that it cannot easily overrule the refusals of medical treatment 
made by competent children.340 Therefore, it is submitted, that courts should only overrule 
decisions by children who do not exhibit full and complete competence as it is in their best 
interests to disallow a decision that is made by children who do not have the competence to make 
such decision. It is submitted that this is the approach that must be adopted, as a child who is not 
competent to make a decision should not be permitted to do so. Such child must be protected 
from making incompetent decisions. It is further submitted that a decision made by a competent 
child should not be overridden under the reasoning that it is in the best interests of the child – a 
decision that has been overruled will only suffice as being in the best interests of the child if the 
child is incompetent to make an autonomous decision. In other words, overriding the decision of 
an incompetent child is appropriate; howbeit, it is inappropriate to override the judgements and 
decisions of a competent child as such child is no longer in need of protection.341 
5.3. The infringement of constitutional rights by overruling refusals of 
medical treatment by competent children 
 
As preceding reasoning suggests, courts have conceded that its power to overrule the wishes of 
competent children must be used sparingly. However, courts have appeared to override the 
decisions of competent and incompetent children if those decisions, such as a refusal of medical 
treatment, result in serious long term risks or hasten death.342 It is believed by courts and parents 
that refusals of medical treatment that result in long term risks and accelerated death are not in 
the best interests of children. It has been submitted that the court may well proceed to take such 
decisions except when faced with the decisions made by competent children. It is further 
submitted that it is in the best interests of incompetent children to override their decisions so as 
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to protect them from decisions that they do not have the necessary competence and maturity to 
make. However, competent children make competent decisions that will be in their best interests 
to carry out. Decisions made by competent children must be respected and upheld irrespective of 
whether death is imminent, as is the practice where adults are concerned.  
More often than not, courts do not intervene when faced with the long term health risks or the 
accelerated death that is consequential of refusals of medical treatment by adults.343 Once a 
person attains the age of majority and legally enjoys adult status, competence is presumed and if 
not rebutted, decisions made by such individuals must be respected by family and healthcare 
professionals. These decisions will be upheld by the courts without question (provided that 
threats to public health or pregnancy have been ruled out344) irrespective of the detrimental or 
fatal consequences which follow a refusal of medical treatment.345 This has been clearly 
endorsed in Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment),346 where Lord Donaldson had recognised 
that every adult has the prima facie right and capacity to decide whether to accept or refuse 
medical treatment, regardless of whether the latter may risk permanent injury to health or result 
in premature death.347 He further acknowledged that issues surrounding whether or not the 
reasons for the refusal were rational, irrational, unknown or possibly non-existent were 
redundant.348 It is for this reason that section 129 (8) which confers power on the Minister to 
consent to the medical treatment that has been unreasonably refused by children cannot be said 
to be a fair practice. Competent adults are permitted to refuse medical treatment even if the 
reasons for such objection are unreasonable and illogical and arouse fatal consequences. As a 
result, competent children should be afforded the same right. Support for this right has been 
found in jurisdictions even beyond our own, such as Canada, per Robins J.A. in the renowned 
case of Malette v Shulman.349 The judge in this case had confirmed that the right to self-
determination encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment if one so wishes as a competent 
adult has the right to refuse specific or all treatment even if this refusal would guide them down a 
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path filled with risks as serious as death, and ‘may appear mistaken in the eyes of the medical 
profession or of the community.’350 This stance settles the argument that the best interests of the 
patient are determined on the basis of ensuring that the autonomy of the patient is respected in 
terms of fulfilling their wishes regarding medical treatment, albeit the lack thereof.351  
The best interests of the patient are not measured with the purpose of preserving the health and 
the life of the patient, at all costs, irrespective of the quality of such life.352 This position is 
supported by our law in terms of section 6 (d) of the National Health Act,353 which permits 
competent individuals to refuse health services. The application of this section does not extend to 
competent adults alone, but to competent children as well in parallel.354 A child will be able to 
refuse medical treatment and have such refusal respected provided that the implications, risks 
and obligations of the refusal of medical treatment have been explained to the child and in return, 
have been understood and accepted by them.355 In addition, the child must be sufficiently mature 
and competent to understand the nature and effect of the refusal.356 The violation of this right 
arises when this refusal of medical treatment by a child may be overridden if parents and courts 
hold the view that it is in the best interests of the child to do so as the lack of treatment that the 
child demands will lead to the death of the child.357 It is irrational and arbitrary that the 
competent refusals of adults are respected and upheld, but the competent refusals of children are 
not. After all, they both have one quality in common and that is competence which ultimately 
distinguishes between individuals who may make autonomous decisions and those who may not 
due to their lack of competence. It is submitted that refusals of medical treatment by competent 
children must be respected and espoused, irrespective of imminent death. It is illogical and unfair 
to override a competent refusal of medical treatment by a competent child who chooses a 
peaceful death over living with a harrowing ailment. It cannot be said to be in the best interests 
of the child to overrule his or her refusal thus, forcing the child to endure the pain and agony of 
the ailment and moreover, endure further torment by undergoing unsolicited treatment. The pain, 
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agony and torment that an adult is legally entitled to refuse to endure throughout his or her life 
whereas a competent child is compelled to succumb to suffering of the like, as the view that 
‘treatment will always be in the bests interests of the child’ is absurdly held.358 Life is not always 
better than death.359 Treatment does not always provide relief, nor is it always pleasant. There are 
many instances where treatment does more harm than good, or it may appear to bring short term 
relief without any prospect for long term benefits and is highly invasive, painful and results in 
negative long-term effects.360  In most cases the medical treatment that has been refused has been 
extensive treatment that offers no reasonable hope of recovery or improvement and do not 
provide the child with any benefit.361 Such futile medical treatment provides little or no positive 
effect on or benefit to the child; on the contrary, it deteriorates the quality of life of the child. It is 
submitted that it is not in the best interests of the child to subject the child to medical treatment 
that compromises his or her dignity and provides no or little benefit for a short period of time 
while reducing the child’s quality of life for the rest of his or her life. It cannot be in the child’s 
best interests to compel medical treatment purely to ensure the child’s survival where such 
survival proves to be meaningless.  
A meaningless survival and a meaningless life have been addressed in the recent case of 
Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others.362 Granting that 
this case had addressed the legality of active voluntary euthanasia in the form of doctor-assisted 
suicide, matters of which are not for discussion presently; nevertheless, the principles regarding 
the quality of life are relevant to the issue at hand. The court held that in determining the quality 
of life of a patient, the court must be influenced by the underlying values of the Constitution.363 
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The most important of these values being the right to dignity which is linked to the right to life, 
and the right to life cannot insist that a mentally competent individual ‘is obliged to live, no 
matter what the quality of his life is.’364 It is, therefore, submitted that courts will not be in 
favour of subjecting patients to medical treatment that they object to, merely to preserve their life 
- a life without dignity. Even more so, courts, which strive to adhere to the paramountcy of 
acting in the best interest of the child,365 surely cannot enforce an administration of medical 
treatment against an objecting child who wishes to die with dignity, rather than living a life 
without it. Such coercion will not be in the best interests of the child considering that the right to 
life and the right to dignity are so inextricably linked that the constitutional right to life cannot be 
enjoyed if an individual is compelled to live a life without dignity.366 A competent child cannot 
be obligated to live and be burdened with a life without dignity; a life that an adult will not be 
expected to live.367 Hence, it is submitted, that the right to life includes the right to die when life 
can no longer be carried out in a dignified manner. This is inferred by section 11 (3) of the 
Children’s Act which bestows a right on children suffering with disabilities or chronic illnesses 
not to be subjected to medical, social, cultural or religious practices that will prove to be 
detrimental to their health, well-being and dignity. Children who fall victim to these malaises, 
and competent children, of whom are seemingly not mentioned in this section, who suffer from 
any illness, sickness or disease that they express competent refusals of medical treatment for 
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should not be subjected to medical, social, cultural or religious practices that will be detrimental 
to their health, well-being and dignity. Competent refusals of medical treatment by children 
regarding any type of disability or illness should be respected and fulfilled, especially once such 
treatment compromises the dignity of the child. To compel treatment against the child’s wishes 
would infringe their constitutional rights to life, dignity as well as bodily and psychological 
integrity.368  
It is regarded as cruel and inhuman, behaviour that all individuals are constitutionally protected 
against,369 to subject a child to a life filled with pain and suffering, a life that is ‘demonstrably 
going to be so awful’ that such child must be condemned to die in dignity.370 Children who 
decide to forego life-saving treatment and live out the rest of their lives with dignity should be 
allowed to die in dignity as this is the right that is enjoyed not only by adults - it is the 
fundamental human right of all to be able to die with dignity which our courts are obliged, in 
terms of Sections 1 (a), 7 (2) and 8 (3) (a) of the Constitution,371 to ‘advance, respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil.’372 Consequently, to deny children the right to die in dignity would be in 
direct conflict with these stipulated rights as our Constitution has been founded on dignity, the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms as well as the achievement of equality.373 Depriving 
competent children of the right to die in dignity, a right that competent adults are freely entitled 
to, by no means protects dignity or achieves the equality that our Constitution strives to ensure. It 
is illogical to tell a severely ill individual who is capable of competently refusing medical 
treatment that he or she must endure the indignity of the excruciating pain and suffering, and is 
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not permitted to refuse treatment to die in a dignified manner.374 It is even more absurd to expect 
a child to suffer this fate. It is submitted that holding these expectations of a child and coercing a 
meeting of such expectations would not be in the best interests of the child.  
Undermining the right of a child to refuse treatment in order to embrace death with dignity, in 
addition to compelling an administration of the unwelcomed treatment, does not only infringe 
constitutional rights, but directly violates statutory law in terms of section 7 (l) (i) and (ii) of the 
Children’s Act. These sections ensure that children are protected, when determining what would 
be in their best interests, from any psychological or physical harm that may result from 
subjecting them to degradation or harmful behaviour. Subjecting an unwilling competent child to 
medical treatment exposes such child to physical harm that is accompanied by forcing the child 
to endure degrading medical treatment which encroaches upon his or her right to dignity as well 
as the right not to be subjected to degradation or harmful behaviour, as inferred by section 7 (l) 
(i) and (ii) of the Children’s Act. Furthermore, forcing a child to undergo medical treatment 
causes the emotional trauma that the Children’s Act seeks to protect - this impinges the right of a 
child to be protected from damaging psychological harm arising from coerced medical treatment. 
In the case of Re LDK,375 the court found that the emotional distress of receiving an unwanted 
blood transfusion (the same applies to unwanted treatment) would have a negative effect on 
treatment as well as on the child and that the purpose of healthcare is to ensure the well-being of 
all patients, in both emotional and physical respects, and compelling medical treatment cannot 
achieve this end.376 For these reasons, denigrating a child’s competent refusal of medical 
treatment as they prefer to die with dignity will not suffice as a decision taken in the best 
interests of the child. 
In consequence, our law must be developed, as required by our Constitution, to protect the right 
of children to die with dignity in order to give effect to and respect this right.377 At present, this 
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is currently in progress as courts are expressing reluctance to overrule informed refusals made by 
competent children as the constitutional rights of the latter are gradually attaining recognition 
and respect.378 
5.4. Conclusion  
   
The best interests of children are a paramount consideration in all matters affecting them. This 
has been confirmed by the Constitution and the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, as well as 
international and regional human rights conventions. As indicated in the discussion above, 
parents and children have different perceptions of what would be in the best interests of the child 
concerned. It has been submitted in this chapter that compelling competent children to undergo 
medical treatment against their wishes is not always in their best interests. This is especially so 
when treatment is provides little benefit for the child. It has been submitted that compelling 
medical treatment against the wishes of the child would infringe upon their constitutional rights 
to dignity and life. The right to dignity allows a child to refuse medical treatment that would 
compromise their dignity. This occurs when the medical treatment causes more harm than it 
provides benefit. The right to life allows a child to end their lives if they wish. Children should 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Right of Children to Refuse Medical Treatment Based on Religious 
Beliefs  
 
Medicine is a practice and a spiritual path. Remembering this deep meaning is what keeps us from 
burning out, and it is what keeps us alive. We must always remember that we serve life through 
Medicine, not because it is broken, but because it is Holy.  
- Rachel Naomi Remen  
6.1. Introduction 
 
The above quotation made by MD, Founder and Director of The Institute for the Study of Health 
and Illness, encapsulates the importance of religion and faith in the sphere of Medical Law and 
emphasizes that one sphere cannot be successful without the other – one cannot experience 
healing without faith in the healthcare system, neither can one practice Medicine without the 
practice of faith. 
Religious beliefs generally lie at the heart of the family.379 These strong beliefs are passed on 
from generation to generation and accumulate strength in the hearts and minds of believers to 
such an extent that they base medical decisions on these beliefs. It is for this reason that 
numerous religious groups oppose the idea of conventional medical treatment380 and refuse the 
assistance of doctors, the use of drugs as well as the intervention of surgery as they prefer to rely 
on God, prayer and faith for healing.381 
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The most widely recognized religious denomination is the First Church of Christ Scientists, also 
known as ‘Christian Science’, which was founded in 1879 by Mary Baker Eddy in New 
England.382 Christian Scientists do not believe in the reality of sicknesses, diseases or disorders 
and rather hold the belief that ailments, illnesses, and maladies are manifestations of the mind 
that are only capable of healing by praying and drawing closer to God.383 Christian Science 
healers are commonly known as ‘practitioners’ and the manner in which they perform their 
duties are by the practice of pure, heartfelt and meticulous prayer which brings about a profound 
understanding of a person’s actual spiritual being as a child of God.384 This understanding is 
essential in dissolving the mental state of the ill person from which all sicknesses and diseases 
stem.385 Other religious sects who spurn modern day medical treatment and promote healing 
through prayer and faith include The Church of God of the Union Assembly, Inc., General 
Assembly and Church of the First Born, Faith Assembly Church, Faith Tabernacle Church, No 
Name Fellowship and Jehovah’s Witnesses.386 Of these denominations, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
appear to be the most prevalent form in South Africa.  
Jehovah’s Witnesses, though their population is fairly small, have often created difficulties for 
our courts as a result of their unique beliefs.387 They believe that they will lose their eligibility to 
enter ‘paradise’ if they accept blood transfusions388 as Biblical verses389 forbid believers from 
‘eating blood’ which Jehovah’s Witnesses believe to be the equivalent of a blood transfusion. 
Unlike other religious groups who reject all methods and forms of conventional medical 
treatment, believers of the Jehovah’s Witness faith largely accept most forms of conventional 
medical treatment. However, they shun the use of blood transfusions and even avoid undergoing 
medical procedures and operations which may increase the likelihood of requiring blood 
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transfusions for its success.390 Members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith even reject the 
recirculation of their own blood once it has been removed from their bodies as it is no longer 
considered pure.391  
Jehovah’s Witnesses are well aware of the consequences of their decisions to refuse blood 
transfusions and accept the fact that the failure to accept a blood transfusion may result in their 
death.392 It is important to note that competent adult believers who reject medical treatment 
including blood transfusions, have a constitutionally protected right to do so.393 This right is 
protected by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa394 in terms of section 15 (1) which 
states that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. 
This section allows any competent adult to refuse any form of medical treatment even if death is 
likely to ensue. The right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment is also guaranteed by 
the National Health Act 61 of 2003 which confers an obligation on a health care provider to 
inform the health care user of their right to refuse health services and explain the risks, 
implications and obligations of such refusal.395 This right is further supported by the right to 
privacy and self-determination,396 which allows one to decide their own fate and make decisions 
that are not obstructed by any external influences. It allows a person to carry their decision 
through without the fear of interference. The right to self-determination is drawn from the 
constitutionally affirmed right to security in and control over one’s body397 which permits the 
bearers of this right the freedom to decide what happens to their own bodies.  Accordingly, when 
an adult makes the decision to refuse medical intervention that could even be life-saving, having 
full capacity to do so, the courts accept this decision without intervening. 
The position is different when minor children are involved. It is evident from the above that 
religious credence and pressure received from parents who are deep into their faith, often prevent 
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a child from consenting to medical treatment and thus, is coerced into refusing what could 
sometimes be regarded as life-saving medical treatment. 
 
6.2. Parental refusal of medical treatment for their children based on 
religious grounds 
 
It is not uncommon for parents to refuse medical treatment for their minor children solely 
because of their religious objections or to coerce their children into refusing medical treatment 
due to religious beliefs, even though these refusals may result in the death of the child.398 A 
medical practitioner who wished to overrule these decisions by parents were welcome to 
approach the High Court for an order of the same and the High Court would act as the upper 
guardian of all minor children.399 This was a common occurrence prior to the provisions of the 
Children’s Act and an influential judgement - doctors are no longer required to obtain a court 
order to overturn parental refusals as refusals of medical treatment by parents that are based on 
religious grounds alone have now been deemed as unconstitutional and therefore, unlawful.400 
This influential judgement made by the High Court in Hay v B401 was reached after Dr Hay, the 
paediatrician attending to the infant, applied to the court as matter of urgency for an order 
authorizing her to administer a life-saving blood transfusion to an infant despite objections by the 
parents that the blood transfusion was contrary to their religious beliefs and that they had 
concerns relating to the risk of infection that may result from the transfusion.402 Dr Hay testified 
that there was no guarantee that the infant would survive if the blood transfusion was 
administered; however, she could in ‘all probability’403 state that if it was not, the infant would 
definitely not survive.404 She further testified about the unlikelihood of the blood being 
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contaminated to spread infection due to the blood screening procedures that are conducted prior 
to the administration of a blood transfusion.405 The High Court held that while the parents’ 
religious beliefs should not be ignored and rather respected and considered, ‘…the evidence 
established that their beliefs negated the essential content of the infant’s right to life.’406 This 
means that the parents’ religious contentions were neither reasonable nor justifiable and could 
not override the infant’s right to life as this right is a basic constitutional value that was 
inviolable.407 The High Court granted an order authorizing Dr Hay to administer the blood 
transfusion to the infant indicating that the best interests of the child are of paramount 
importance according to our Constitution that further, the interests of the infant outweighed the 
parents’ religious disputations.408 The advent of this case resulted in the unconstitutionality of 
parental refusal of medical treatment solely on religious grounds; therefore, these reasons for 
refusal by parents will not suffice.  
Courts further respond to the dilemma of conflicting rights of adamant parents and their 
pressured children by referring to the case of Prince v Massachusetts409 where the court held that 
the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose a child to communicable 
disease, ill health or death.410 The court quoted: 
‘Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves, but it does not follow that they are free, in 
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full 
and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.’411 
Religious dogmas compel parents to refuse medical treatment which, in turn, places encumbering 
pressure on their children to hold the same view and refuse medical treatment for themselves.412 
The court in Prince concludes that parents cannot refuse medical treatment for their children, or 
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influence them to do so, solely on the basis that it is not in accordance with their religious tenets. 
This decision is not theirs to make. 
Shortly after the judgement of the case of Hay, the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 provided a clear 
direction, although poorly abided by even in the present day, in which to proceed. It now protects 
children from these parental decisions and intimidation to refuse medical treatment on religious 
grounds by requiring parents to provide a medically accepted alternative to the medical treatment 
or surgical operation that they are refusing for their children.413 In the absence of this 
alternative,414 and in the presence of a refusal, courts are virtually unanimous in authorizing the 
transmission of the blood transfusion despite the religious objections by the parents.415 Courts 
can only order the commission of medical treatment if a dispute reaches the court. Many cases 
are not presented to court for resolution and are left unsettled usually at the expense of the child. 
If the situation does not reach the court timeously to save the life of the child, the parents may 
face criminal charges of child maltreatment or abuse, culpable homicide or even murder.416 
Although some states have a ‘spiritual treatment’ clause which exonerates parents from 
prosecution or provides a defence that they were exercising their religious beliefs in good 
faith,417 South Africa does not grant the same leniency. The view maintained is supported in this 
dissertation. 
As seen from the above, courts are not impressed by parents who refuse medical treatment for 
their children or burden them with the pressures of doing so themselves and will not tolerate such 
decisions. Parents are only permitted to make decisions of this nature with regard to their own 
lives and not those of their children.418 Hence, when faced with these situations, courts need to 
continue to aggressively ensure that the interests and rights of the child to consent to or refuse 
medical treatment are protected against their parents’ potentially debilitating beliefs.419 
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6.3. Children who refuse medical treatment on religious grounds:  
Foreign case law 
 
The Constitution declares that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion illustrating that everyone, adult or minor, is permitted to exercise this right as 
they wish and as prescribed by their religion;420 even if it entails refusing life-saving medical 
treatment due to religious creeds. Decisions to refuse medical treatment based on religious 
indoctrinations are not only taken by parents. Although not welcomed by parents and health care 
practitioners, children who are firmly grounded in their faith also refuse medical treatment for 
themselves. In this event, parents and healthcare practitioners usually respond to such refusal 
with resounding negativity by instituting legal intervention compelling the child to undergo the 
medical treatment that has unwaveringly been refused.  
It has become apparent that the situations in which legal intervention has been prompted by a 
child’s refusal of medical treatment fall into one of three categories. The first situation arises 
where treatment has been refused by a minor who is mentally ill or mentally disturbed rendering 
such refusal invalid as he or she lacks the capacity to provide a valid refusal.421 In this category, 
minors are afflicted with defects in their ability to comprehend, reason and make meticulous 
decisions justifying the commission of coerced medical treatment.422 Secondly, children are 
habitually coerced to submit to treatment by legal interference despite the fact that they are 
mature and competent enough to refuse medical treatment for their own reasons. Such 
submission, as debated in a preceding chapter, cannot and should not be justified once the child 
has proven to be sufficiently mature to refuse treatment. Of particular relevance to this 
discussion, refusals of medical treatment are incited by a religious belief, held by a child, that 
denounces the prescribed method of treatment.423 Children belonging to this category do not 
have an impaired ability to reason, understand and make competent decisions. They are mature 
and have the capacity to make well thought decisions, similarly to children belonging to category 
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two.424 Basing a refusal of medical treatment upon a sincerely held religious belief that would 
undoubtedly be accepted had the refusal been made by a person enjoying major status,425 should 
equally be accepted by a mature and competent child making a refusal of the like.426 What 
follows is an analysis of the foreign law cases of Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick 
Competency)427 and In Re E.G. (Ernestine Gregory)428 which will be used in order to make 
recommendations for the South African position governing refusals of medical treatment by 
children based on religious beliefs. 
6.3.1. Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) 
 
The High Court in Re L had occasion to consider whether to sanction surgical intervention 
inclusive of blood transfusions with the intention of saving the life of a 14 year old girl, or 
support her refusal to accept medical treatment.429 Following in the footsteps of her parents, L 
was a devoted Jehovah’s Witness who had suffered from epilepsy.430 She had fallen, fully 
clothed, into a bath of hot water resulting in burns on 54 percent of her body surface with 40 
percent of those burns being third degree burns.431 According to the expert opinion of a burns 
consultant, L’s injuries were so severe that it required three operations that were essential for her 
survival.432 These operations required blood transfusions to which L had expressly indicated, 
both verbally as well as in the form of her ‘no blood card’433 that she was not be given any blood 
in the event that she may need them if she sustained injuries.434 Doctors had confirmed that the 
medical treatment would provide a ‘very optimistic’ chance of survival, whereas without the 
treatment, L would succumb to her injuries after a fatal onset of gangrene - this end had not been 
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disclosed to her.435 Despite L’s adamant refusal of medical treatment, the hospital had 
successfully sought an order for the administration of blood and blood products during the 
progression of treatment without L’s consent.436 This order sparked a legally controversial 
dilemma that was only resolvable upon a balance of the minor’s right to religion coupled with 
her degree of understanding, competence and maturity.437 
The court’s deliberation on L’s capacity to refuse treatment had been a thorough one, beginning 
with detailed knowledge about the background of her religious faith.438 An assessment conducted 
by a child psychiatrist revealed that L had embraced all that her religion had required of her 
wholeheartedly, unashamedly, and most significantly, by her own will.439 Evidence had been led 
by the child psychiatrist that L’s faith was ‘strongly held’,440 without being subjected to the 
influence of her parents or stepfather as there was no indication that they forced her to maintain 
her refusal.441 This verifies that the decision to refuse treatment had been that of L alone - a 
decision, based on her life enduring religious belief that is her right to make. Decisions founded 
upon religious principles must remain a right belonging to a mature and competent child as 
liberally as it belongs to an adult, without undermining it in any manner442 - these decisions must 
be upheld as swiftly as it is when adults are concerned. Unfortunately, L’s wishes had not been 
granted the respect that it had deserved due to an incongruous finding of incompetence.  
Subsequent to assessing L’s competence, the court found that she had lacked competence to 
refuse medical treatment for two reasons. The first reason pertained to the fact that her ardent 
religious lifestyle had also been a sheltered one, depriving her of the experience of life; thus, 
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limiting it.443 The other implausible reason that gave rise to a finding of incompetence was that L 
was ‘not able to be given all the details’ necessary to make a competent decision.444 Hereof, the 
court stated: 
‘[Her religious lifestyle] necessarily limits her understanding of matters which are as grave as her 
own present situation. It may be that because of her belief she is willing to say, and to mean it, ‘I 
am willing to accept death rather than to have a blood transfusion’, but it is clear in this case that 
she has not been able to be given all the details which it would be right and appropriate to have in 
mind when making such a decision.’445 
The first inference drawn is that her rigid religious dedication has limited her ability to make a 
decision based on her right to religious belief.446 The court attributed this to the fact that children 
uncompromisingly adopt their religious beliefs whereas adults would be willing to change their 
position by a process of reasoning and the use of life experience, therefore, it is only adults 
whom are able to make competent decisions based on religious obligations.447 On the contrary, it 
is submitted, that possessing absolute belief without being fickle minded and easily persuaded to 
turn one’s back on one’s faith, are the very essence of religious belief.448 Deep religious faith is 
not only properly acquired with the passage of time and defies all reasoning, rationality, 
intelligence, understanding, maturity and developed cognitive functioning. All of which the High 
Court had erroneously suggested in Re L.449 All of these qualities are irrelevant to and should not 
be used as the basis for assessing the competence of children to make a religiously sound 
decision.450 In actual fact, relying on this reasoning, children would be far more well-equipped to 
make a religiously sound decision than adults would, considering that they possess an 
unwavering belief in their faith that defies rationality and reasoning that adults unnecessarily 
attach to their religious belief – which are the very attributes that are alien to religious belief.451 
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This confirms that children have the right to make decisions based on their religious teachings 
and should, without intervention, be permitted to do so. 
The second inference is that the court had denied L’s competence on the deliberate concealment 
of information conveyed to her by her family, doctor, as well as hospital staff who did not deem 
it necessary to inform L about the consequences of refusing a blood transfusion in that her 
refusal would lead to fatal gangrene.452 This omission of information indicates that L had lacked 
vital information, without which, she was unable to fully understand her predicament and make a 
decision acceptable by the court. L was denied the right to make an informed refusal through no 
fault of hers.453 The fact that L had not been informed of the risks of her decision shows that she 
had been deprived of her right to make a valid refusal as a decision made as a result of partial 
information cannot be a true decision.454 Due to this flaw that the court could have corrected by 
ordering that L receive the omitted information, she was denied competence because the court 
found that her understanding was eroded by defects.455 Although true, her understanding was not 
defective due to her own inherent defects but because she was denied the opportunity to make a 
competent decision due to the fault of the court. Therefore, a finding of incompetence in this case 
was a troubling error that should have instantaneously been rescinded. 
Another disconcerting error was the court’s statement that the same order of incompetence 
would have been granted had L been found to be competent.456 This cannot be so. This 
constitutes an unfair and blatant violation of a child’s right to make autonomous decisions and to 
exercise their religious values without restrictions. If the outcome is already known by courts 
prior to embarking upon an assessment of competence, courts should not tediously apply a test of 
competence that clearly holds no significance or relevance to their judgement. If neither judges 
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nor society are willing to permit children to ‘court unfavourable outcomes in judgements relating 
to medical treatment, we should say so openly.’457 Pretense assessments should not be conducted 
merely for the sake of complying with a legal requirement. These tests of competence are the 
ground upon which children may or may not be able to exercise their rights and must be 
conducted in all solemnity.  
Unfortunately, the principles that South African Law can implement from this case is, bluntly, 
‘what not to do.’ The decision reached in Re L was ‘undoubtedly incorrect’458 for three reasons.  
To begin with, the court’s first finding of incompetence was inspired by the fact that children, 
like L, hold staunch and unwavering faith in their religion that is unchanged by reasoning, 
rationality, intelligence and other cognitive functions that were believed by the court to only 
develop through a passage of time – including the development of religious belief. However, 
absolute faith and belief are the quintessence of religion, whereas rationality and reasoning are 
not. This means that children are able base their decisions on the right to religion in the purest 
manner and must not be deprived of doing so considering that religion is a right that everyone is 
eligible to exercise (children even more so, so it seems). Consequently, children are competent to 
and should be able to exercise their constitutional religious freedom in medical matters without 
question. 
The court’s second finding of incompetence centered on their indiscretion that had successfully 
been passed off as that of L’s. Vital information had deliberately been concealed from L’s 
knowledge and the President of the Family Division did not wish to order the conferring of this 
information to her, despite the fact that such information was her right to receive and was 
material in order for her to be able to make an informed decision. To reach a valid and informed 
refusal, one must be cognisant of all material facts and risks and to be denied of such information 
means being denied of your right to make informed decisions. All information significant to 
reaching a competent decision must be provided to children, as they are provided to adults. If an 
omission of information does occur, a finding of incompetence cannot be made in the first place. 
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The concluding finding that cannot hold a place in South African Law is that assessing 
competence is insignificant. Competence determines whether or not a child is able to exercise 
their rights as most legal functions that could be performed by children require a prior finding of 
competence, making this assessment the center of children’s rights. As a result, if a child in 
question displays the requisite competence; he or she must be able to carry out their rights. In 
this case, competent children must be able to make a religious refusal of medical treatment. 
6.3.2. In Re E.G. (Ernestine Gregory) 
 
A young girl suffering from acute leukemia required chemotherapy treatment which additionally 
required several blood transfusions.459 Ernestine, together with her mother, had refused these 
transfusions as they were contrary to Ernestine’s religious canons as a Jehovah’s Witness.460 The 
court responded to Ernestine’s refusal by ordering blood transfusions; however, this order had 
been overturned when the appellate court had found that she was a ‘mature minor’ who was 
sufficiently competent to refuse medical treatment, even if the result was fatal, as she had merely 
been exercising her right to the freedom of religion.461 The Illinois Supreme Court had further 
affirmed this finding while confronted with the question of whether or not a child would ever be 
afforded the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment.462 To answer this paramount question, 
the court had deemed it necessary to assess the competence, decision-making capabilities and 
maturity levels of Ernestine and for this referred to testimony by her treating medical practitioner 
who had confirmed that she was a competent minor who understood the consequences of 
accepting as well as rejecting treatment.463 He had further expressed that he was impressed with 
her level of maturity and her ardor for her religious beliefs.464 In favour of Ernestine refusing 
treatment was a psychiatrist who had assessed her decisional capacity and concluded that it had 
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been that of an adult.465 On the basis of these testaments, the court established that mature 
minors, like Ernestine, have a right to refuse medical treatment.466  
The principles that emanate from this case will make a positively momentous impact if adopted 
by South African Medical Law. This case emphasizes that the constitutionally guaranteed right 
to exercise religious freedom belongs to minors inasmuch as it belongs to adults. Evaluating 
competence is crucial in determining whether or not children are amply mature to refuse medical 
treatment based on religious instructions and should not be precluded from doing so if their 
competence has been established by ‘clear and convincing evidence’467 that the child in question 
is a mature minor capable of making a ‘mature, reflective and weighty decision.’468 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa declares that everyone has the right to freedom 
of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion illustrating that everyone, adult or minor, is 
permitted to exercise this right as they wish and as prescribed by their religion.469 This right 
entails refusing life-saving medical treatment if one’s religious beliefs require it. Children are as 
equally entitled to the enjoyment of this right as adults are. Therefore, it is submitted, when a 
child who is competent to understand what a refusal medical treatment entails, such refusal must 
not be overturned. Compelling an unwilling competent child to undergo medical treatment that 
his or her religious beliefs prohibits infringes his or her constitutional right to right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. 
Due to the lack of legislation governing refusals of medical treatment by children, foreign case 
law was used to illustrate the principles that South African Law should consider. The case of Re 
                                                          
465
 Re E.G. supra. 
466
 Re E.G. supra 325. 
467
 Re E.G. supra 327. The court considered the testimonies provided by the attending physician as well as the 
psychiatrist as ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of Ernestine’s maturity and competence, and relied on this evidence 
when deciding the case. In Re Long Island Jewish Medical Center (1990) 557 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) the court had 
ruled against a minor’s refusal of medical treatment due to the absence of clear and convincing evidence of his 
ability to make a mature decision. 
468
 In Re Long Island Jewish Medical Center (1990) 557 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 241-243. 
469
 Section 15 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
 
82 | P a g e  
 
L, had stressed the importance of assessing the competence of children to refuse medical 
treatment. Competence determines whether or not a child is able to exercise their rights. 
Therefore, if a child displays the requisite competence; he or she must be able to carry out their 
rights. It is submitted that competent children must be able to make a religious refusal of medical 
treatment without their decisions being overruled. The case concluded that children are able base 
their decisions on the right to religion in the purest manner and must not be deprived of doing so. 
The case of Re E.G. also emphasizes the importance of establishing the competence of a child to 
refuse medical treatment. The court stated that once competence has been established by ‘clear 
and convincing evidence’470 that the child in question is a mature minor capable of making a 
‘mature, reflective and weighty decision,’471 a refusal of medical treatment by the child must be 
respected. 
It is submitted that when faced with a child’s refusal of medical treatment based on religious 
grounds, assessing the competence of the child to make such refusal is vital. Children who 
possess competence deserve to have their refusal of religiously prohibited medical treatment 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1. Concluding remarks and recommendations 
 
While South Africa continues to make significant progress in many areas, there are areas, such as 
children’s rights, which need ongoing review and evaluation. This had been done once when the 
Child Care Act was reviewed and subsequently repealed by the Children’s Act. The submission 
in this dissertation is that another review is needed; a review of the Children’s Act, and in 
particular, of section 129 (2). 
The consent to medical treatment by children is governed by section 129 (2) of the Children’s 
Act. The approach taken in this dissertation is that the corollary right of the right to consent to 
medical treatment, is the right to refuse medical treatment. However, due to the fact that the 
Children’s Act fails to recognise and make provision for the converse of the right to consent to 
medical treatment, the right of children to refuse medical treatment has been inferred from 
section 129 (2). The right of children to refuse medical treatment is a significant right and it is 
not sufficient that this right be inferred from another right. The right to refuse medical treatment 
by children is in need of a place of its own in the Children’s Act, even if it is included as a part of 
section 129 (2). Therefore, it is recommended that the right to refuse medical treatment by 
children be clearly included in the Children’s Act in order for children to have a salient right to 
refuse medical treatment.  
When enacting the right to refuse medical treatment, inspiration can be drawn from section 129 
(2), which allows children to consent to medical treatment, considering that refusal is the 
counter-coin of consent. However, in order to do this, section 129 (2) must first be altered.  
Section 129 (2) gives children the right to consent to (and the inferred right to refuse) medical 
treatment, provided that they meet the requirements stipulated in the section. Section 129 (2) 
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states that a child may consent to his or her own medical treatment if the child is over the age of 
12 years and is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
risks, social, and other implications of the treatment. As discussed in chapter three, section 129 
(2) uses a ‘combined-approach’ in order for children to be eligible to consent to or refuse 
medical treatment; the child must be over the age of 12 years and be competent. The Choice Act, 
however, does not require the attainment of a certain age in order for minors to consent to or 
refuse to consent to a termination of pregnancy. It is recommended that the Children’s Act 
follow suit and mould the legislation closely akin to the Choice Act to allow children, regardless 
of age, to refuse consent to medical treatment as long as they are competent and capable of doing 
so. The manner in which the Children’s Act should read is as follows: 
A child may consent to or refuse consent to his or her own medical treatment if the child 
is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, 
social, and other implications of receiving the treatment, or of not receiving the 
treatment. 
This means that the approach that is to be adopted by the Children’s Act should focus on 
maturity as a test for competence. Age should not form part of the basis of a test to establish 
competence. Where the legislation requires the presence of ‘sufficient maturity’ and ‘mental 
capacity,’ this dissertation has recommended two approaches that the Children’s Act should 
adopt in order to determine whether children are sufficiently mature and competent to refuse 
medical treatment.  
The first approach is the ‘Mature Minor’ doctrine which stipulates that children who have the 
ability to understand the nature, risks, and consequences of refusing medical treatment are 
entitled to refuse medical treatment despite disagreement from parents or other third parties. 
Children who satisfy the doctrine display a sufficient level of maturity and ought to have their 
decisions respected by others, irrespective of their age. This doctrine focuses on the maturity of 
the child rather than on the child’s age. According to the foreign cases that have applied this 
doctrine, the courts had done so on a case-by-case basis acknowledging that competence is a 
subjective concept requiring subjective testing. The competence of children to refuse medical 
treatment differs from child to child and is based on their level of maturity and not on their age. 
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These cases have frowned upon the use of strict age limits to determine competence to refuse 
medical treatment.  
The second approach, which is of similar nature to the ‘Mature Minor’ doctrine, is the principle 
of ‘Gillick competence’. The court in the Gillick case had stated that the essence of this principle 
was that children may consent to treatment if they are ‘normally intelligent and [are] reasonably 
capable of assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed treatment and providing 
effective consent to such treatment.’472 The principle of ‘Gillick competence’ applies to refusals 
of medical treatment as well. Thus, the ability to refuse treatment will depend on the child’s 
maturity and understanding, and not on the child’s age. The judge in the Gillick case had 
confirmed that once a decision has been made by a Gillick competent child, this decision cannot 
be disrespected by interference by parents or other third parties as parental decision-making 
authority ends when the child demonstrates sufficient understanding and intelligence as well as 
sufficient intellectual and emotional maturity. 
It is recommended that the ‘Mature Minor’ doctrine and the principle of ‘Gillick competence’ be 
adopted by the Children’s Act as tests to determine whether or not a child is competent to refuse 
medical treatment. Once a child proves to be competent to refuse medical treatment, this refusal 
is deserving of respect by all and must be upheld. 
Once the age limit prescribed by the Children’s Act has been removed and the right to refuse 
medical treatment has been provided for as recommended, the only test by which to determine 
the competence of children to refuse medical treatment will be the assessment of maturity. The 
‘Mature Minor’ doctrine and the principle of ‘Gillick competence’ have already been 
recommended as methods to determine maturity. However, there must also be a manner by 
which these maturity assessments are to be made and the Children’s Act does not prescribe the 
means of ascertaining whether children are ‘sufficiently mature’ or possess the necessary ‘mental 
capacity’ to refuse medical treatment.  Thus, it is submitted, that there is a need for the 
Children’s Act to prescribe a test by which to make maturity determinations. There are two 
methods that have been recommended which would assist healthcare professionals and parents as 
well as courts in determining whether or not a child is sufficiently mature and competent to 
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refuse treatment. These methods would also bring understanding of why a child in question 
chooses to refuse medical treatment.  
The first method entails explaining, to the child, the nature, extent, risks and obligations of the 
medical treatment as well as the effects and consequences of refusing it. Thereafter, the child 
should be asked to paraphrase what has been explained to him or her in order to determine 
whether the child has understood the nature and consequences of their decision. This would 
simply allow one to determine whether or not children ‘know what they are doing’ when they 
express adamant refusals of medical treatment. In addition, the child must be asked a series of 
questions that are suitable for evaluating a child’s ability to refuse medical treatment. To assist in 
this endeavor, questions relating to the child’s suffering, discomforts, and effects of medical 
treatment will reveal the child’s ability to understand the nature of their malady. Questions about 
whether the child believes that there is a need for treatment, whether the child believes that there 
are benefits to be provided by treatment, or simply asking the child why they wish to refuse 
treatment analyse the child’s ability to understand the nature of the recommended treatment.  
The second recommended method of assessing maturity emanates from the foreign case of In re 
Moe473 where the court considered various factors in order to assess the maturity level of 
children. The court considered the child’s tone of voice, expressions, and general demeanor; 
whether the child’s responses were well informed and articulate; the degree to which the child 
evaluated and made decisions based on relevant information and the child’s ability to understand 
the decision that he or she has made. It is recommended that these factors be adopted and 
elaborated upon by the South African legal system in order to devise an effective method of 
assessing the maturity of children to make competent refusals of medical treatment.  
Adopting a clear and consistent method of evaluating the maturity and competence of children to 
refuse medical treatment requires a suitable professional to make this crucial assessment. 
Identifying the best suited professional to determine if a child in question possesses the necessary 
mental capacity and maturity to refuse medical treatment is an essential aspect of ensuring the 
accuracy of the results of the assessment of maturity. Therefore, it is submitted that child 
psychiatrists, or individuals who have been trained in cognition, child development or 
                                                          
473
 (1981) 298 12 (Mass. App. Ct.) N.E.2d 1038 423. 
 
87 | P a g e  
 
behavioural medicine should be identified as the correct professionals to make maturity 
assessments. These individuals are specifically trained to make maturity assessments and 
evaluate the competence and development of children. 
Once the maturity level of a child has been assessed and the presence of competence has been 
found by an appropriate professional using a prescribed method of assessing competence and 
maturity as recommended, it is submitted that the child’s right to refuse medical treatment is 
worthy of respect and should not be overruled. This submission would bring equality in the 
exercise of children’s rights and the rights afforded to adults. In other words, children will be 
able to exercise their rights in the same manner that adults do. The right of children to possess 
and fulfil their rights on the same platform as adults is implied by Section 7 (1) of the 
Constitution and the UDHR which affirm that all individuals are equal in dignity and rights. 
Applying these principles to the medical law context will allow children to have their refusals of 
medical treatment respected provided that they are competent just as the competent refusals of 
treatment made by adults are respected. Incompetent refusals by adults are overruled by virtue of 
their incompetence. Therefore, it is submitted that it is only when children show evidence of 
insufficient maturity and capacity to refuse medical treatment can such refusal be overruled.  
Overruling the competent refusals of medical treatment made by children would infringe upon 
many of their rights, some of which have been discussed in this dissertation. The rights of 
children to participate in matters that affect them are governed by the CRC and the Children’s 
Act. The provisions of these documents confer authority upon children to express their views in 
all matters concerning them and have those views considered in accordance with their age, 
maturity and development. Moreover, these provisions recognise that children have a separate 
‘voice’ worthy of being heard and are not mere subjects of a third party’s authority. Children 
who are competent to form views and express these views must be taken seriously, regardless of 
whether the views expressed are refusals of medical treatment.  
The argument that has been thoroughly discussed and submitted in this dissertation is that 
children have the right to refuse medical treatment provided that they are sufficiently mature to 
understand the nature, risks, effects and consequences of a refusal of medical treatment. Once 
this level of competence has been attained, children should be permitted to refuse medical 
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treatment without the fear of their refusal being overruled by parents, healthcare professionals or 
courts. There is no justification for overruling a refusal of medical treatment that is a competent 
and informed refusal; the fact that a child has made this competent refusal is insignificant and 
should not be used as a ground to justify the overruling of a refusal. Should the refusal of 
treatment made by a competent child be overruled, this would infringe their right to refuse the 
medical treatment that their competence allows. 
The constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity that protects children from 
unauthorized interferences of their bodies will be infringed if medical treatment that has been 
refused is ordered to be performed on an unwilling child. The Choice Act realises the importance 
of the right of children to bodily and psychological integrity by allowing pregnant minors to 
make autonomous decisions regarding their bodies. The Choice Act declares that the pregnant 
minor alone has the right to decide whether or not to undergo a termination of pregnancy. The 
provisions of the Choice Act do not require the consent or involvement of any third party in the 
making of this decision, unless the minor is incompetent. It is submitted that the Children’s Act 
adopt the same approach when a child refuses medical treatment by making the choice to refuse 
treatment the sole decision of the child, unless the child is incompetent to refuse treatment. 
The Constitution and the Children’s Act as well as other international and regional human rights 
conventions require that the best interests of the child be a paramount consideration in all matters 
concerning the child. However, the right of the child to be treated in accordance with their best 
interests is encroached upon when their competent refusals of medical treatment are overridden. 
Furthermore, it is not always in the best interests of children to enforce the administration of 
medical treatment. This is particularly so when the medical treatment is invasive, futile and 
offers little benefit to the child. In these circumstances, children should not be plagued with 
unwanted medical treatment and should be allowed to die in dignity. To compel medical 
treatment would be to violate the child’s right to be treated in accordance with his or her best 
interests and would likewise violate his or her constitutional right to dignity and life.  
The constitutional right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion permits children, similarly to 
adults, to refuse medical treatment that is prohibited by their religious beliefs. Medical treatment 
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that is inconsistent with religious beliefs should not be forced upon a child who has competently 
refused it, resulting in a violation of their constitutional right to religion, belief and opinion.  
7.2. Summary of recommendations 
 
1. The Children’s Act must be reviewed in order to: 
 
1.1. Include the right to refuse medical treatment in the Act, even if it is included as part 
of section 129 (2);474 
1.2. Alter section 129 (2) to remove the age limit of 12 years and adopt an approach that 
only requires a child to be sufficiently mature and competent to provide a refusal of 
medical treatment. This should be done in like manner to the Choice Act;475 
1.3. Include an approach that focuses on maturity as a test for determining whether 
children are competent to refuse medical treatment; age should not form part of the basis 
of a test to establish competence. The ‘Mature Minor’ doctrine and the principle of 
‘Gillick competence’ should be adopted as tests to determine whether children are 
competent to refuse medical treatment;476 
1.4. Develop and include a method of assessing the maturity and competence of children 
to refuse medical treatment. The first recommended method entailed asking children to 
paraphrase information about the medical treatment to determine if children understand 
the nature, effects and consequences of their refusals of treatment. The second 
recommended method requires the South African legal system to consider and elaborate 
upon the factors that the court had considered in the case of In re Moe;477 
1.5. Identify the best suited professional to assess the maturity levels of children to refuse 
treatment. Child psychiatrists or individuals who have been trained in cognition, child 
development or behavioural medicine have been recommended;478 
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 This recommendation had been made in chapter three. 
475
 As discussed in chapter three. 
476
 These recommended approaches had been discussed in chapter three. 
477
 As recommended in chapter three. 
478
 These appropriate professionals had been recommended in chapter three. 
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2. Competent children should be afforded equal rights as adults and be permitted to exercise 
them as such. Competent refusals of medical treatment made by children should not be 
overruled as is the practice where competent adults are concerned;479 
3. Overruling a competent refusal of medical treatment by a child would infringe his or her: 
3.1. Right to express his or her views and participate in matters affecting him or her in 
terms of section 10 of the Children’s Act and Article 12 of the CRC;480 
3.2. Right to bodily and psychological integrity in terms of section 12 of the Constitution 
and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights;481 
3.3. Right to be treated in accordance with his or her best interests according to section 28 
(2) and section 9 of the Constitution and the Children’s Act respectively, as well as 
international and regional human rights conventions;482 
3.4. Right to dignity as provided for by section 10 of the constitution;483 
3.5. Right to life as prescribed by section 11 of the Constitution;484 
3.6. Right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way as stated by 
section 12 (1) (e) of the Constitution;485 
3.7. Right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion in terms of section 15 of the 
Constitution.486 
The consideration and implementation of these recommendations would constitute a step in the 
right direction towards giving effect to the significant right of children to refuse medical 
treatment. To illustrate the need to give effect to children’s rights, the words of Richard Farson487 
are echoed:  
‘Rights [must be granted to children] because without them children are incapacitated, 
oppressed and abused.’ 
                                                          
479
 This recommendation has been made and discussed throughout the dissertation. 
480
 As discussed in chapter two. 
481
 As discussed in chapter four. 
482
 As discussed in chapter five. 
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 As discussed in chapter five. 
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 As discussed in chapter five. 
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 As discussed in chapter five. 
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 As discussed in chapter six. 
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 Richard Farson is a psychologist, author, and educator. He is the president and chief executive officer of the 
Western Behavioral Sciences Institute. 
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